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In early 1868 William E. Gladstone presented several
bills in Parliament to disestablish the Church of Ireland.
Prior to 1868 Gladstone had stated his opposition to the
official connection between the Church of Ireland and the
State.

Gladstone, however, had also claimed that he was not

in favor of immediate action and instead advocated restraint
in attacking the Church of Ireland.
rise of the Fenian organization.

The 1860's also saw the

The Fenians were dedicated

to the overthrow of English rule in Ireland and the
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establishment of an Irish republic.

The role that the

Fenians played in convincing Gladstone to disestablish the
Irish church has received varying interpretations from
historians; yet no attempt has been made to look closely at
the issue.
The most important source available is Hansards
Parliamentary Debates.

Much of the formal discussion on the

issue of church disestablishment took place in the House of
Commons.

Hansards gives an excellent account of the

arguments pro and con on this issue.

Hansards also provides

the best available evidence of Gladstone's changing attitude
toward the necessity of action on the question of church
disestablishment.

Various diaries, newspapers, periodicals,

and at least one book written during the period in question
(J. F. Maguire's The Irish in America) were used to assess
the reactions of Gladstone's contemporaries.

These sources

were also used to determine the state of English opinion
toward the Irish in general, the Fenians in particular, and
English views on the necessity of Irish reform.
The execution of three Fenians in 1867 prompted an
outpouring of sympathy for these "martyrs" from the Irish-including some Irishment who had previously been unsympathetic toward the Fenian movement.

Gladstone had hoped to

proceed in a calm and deliberate manner on the question of
disestablishment.

He realized, however, that reform of the

Irish church could not be delayed any longer.

Gladstone

3

feared that further delay would increase popular
sympathy for the Fenians in Ireland, which he also
feared would encourage many of the Irish to question
the wisdom of the Union between England and Ireland.

He

hoped that prompt redress of Irish grievances, of which
disestablishment was one of the most prominent, would
encourage the Irish to maintain the Union.
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INTRODUCTION
In late 1867,

w.

E. Gladstone, one of the leaders of

the Liberal Party, reluctantly came to the conclusion that
the Church of Ireland would have to be disestablished.
Gladstone's motion in 1868 caused the downfall of the
minority government of Disraeli.

The elections in late

1868 were fought primarily on the issue of the
disestablishment of the Church of Ireland.

The Liberal

victory in 1868 meant the end of the Church of Ireland as
the officially established state church.

1

In early 1869

legislation was introduced that not only disestablished the
Church of Ireland, but also disendowed it.

Despite

disharmonious rumblings from the House of Lords, the bill
became law, and on the 1st of January 1871, the Church of
Ireland ceased to exist.
This thesis will argue that Gladstone was motivated,
in large part, to disestablish the Irish church in 1869 by
the potential threat of extensive Irish sympathy for the
Fenian cause.

Gladstone had refused to support the motions

of 1863, 1865, and 1866 that had, in one fashion or another,
attacked the established church in Ireland.

In 1867 he was

willing to give his personal support, but not the support of
the Liberal Party, to the issue of disestablishment.
Gladstone's gradual acceptance of the necessity of action on

2

the question of the Irish church was motivated by the
increasing popularity of the Fenians in Ireland.

In the

1860s, Gladstone had taken part in all of the debates on
the Irish church, except in 1866, when he did not enter the
debate on Gray's motion 2 and expressed his opinion that the
Irish church was an injustice that would have to be taken
care of sometime in the unforeseeable future.

Gladstone was

a cautious politican--he felt that precipitate change was
to be as feared as injustice.

Thus he preferred to address

the question of the Irish in a slow and deliberate manner.
Discontent in Ireland, and the Fenians in particular,
gradually convinced Gladstone that immediate action was
necessary.

Once Gladstone realized that further delay might

create even more public sympathy for the Fenians and
further threaten the union between Ireland and England, he
moved quickly to remove the sources of Irish discontent, one
of which was the Church of Ireland as a state-supported
.
t•1 t u t•ion. 3
ins

Gladstone hoped that disestablishment would

make the Irish more amenable to English rule.
The debate on disestablishment took place against a
backdrop of rising discontent in Ireland, of which
discontent the Fenians were the most conspicuous example. 4
The Fenians came to the notice of the English authorities in
1863, at which time they were considered to be
inconsequential.

By 1865 the organization had grown so

rapidly that the English quickly moved in, arrested the
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leaders, and closed down their newspaper, The Irish People.
The English became so worried about the spread of the
organization that in 1866 the Liberal government under the
leadership of Russell asked for, and got, a suspension
of the Act of Habeas Corpus in Ireland.
the Fenians remained relatively quiet.

Throughout 1866
In 1867 they

illustrated their determination to establish an Irish
republic:

they attempted a raid on the munitions depot at

Chester Castle and engaged in a series of abortive risings
in Ireland. 5

In late 1867, three Fenian conspirators were

executed at Manchester for their part in the death of an
English policeman. 6

In December 1867, the Fenians blew a

hole in the wall of Clerkenwell prison in an attempt to
rescue some of their brethren.

They used too much dynamite

and several people in the surrounding neighborhood were
killed.

The execution of the "Manchester Martyrs" generated

a substantial amount of sympathy for the Fenians in Ireland.
The Clerkenwell explosion enraged English opinion.
Assessing Gladstone's motives for many of his actions
can be difficult, for Gladstone was a complicated man.
had not always been a liberal:

He

he had first sat in

Parliament as a Canningite Tory, and in 1831 and 1832 he
had actively opposed parliamentary reform (which he voted
against in Parliament).

The battle for the repeal of the

Corn Laws in 1846 had transformed his political position;
Gladstone found himself between the two major parties as a
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Peelite.

Finally, in 1859, he decided to join the Liberal

government of Lords Palmerston and Russell.
Theologically, Gladstone started out as an evangelical
(under the influence of his sister) and was very
conservative in his views on the correct relationship
between church and state.

In 1838 he published a book

entitled The State -in Its
With the
- Relations --- Church.

His

book defended the current relationship between the Churches
of England and Ireland and the state.

Gladstone basically

argued that the state had a conscience and was obligated to
support true and correct religion, i.e. Anglican, wherever
it could.

By 1845 his religious views had changed; he had

become a high Anglican under the influence of the Oxford
Movement.

He also no longer believed that the state was

able to determine truth in religion.

On the other hand,

Gladstone never stopped hoping that "there would be one
Church and that the main role of the State would be to
support it

"7

Until his death in 1898, he was willing

to come out of retirement to def end the Church of England
against the disestablishment schemes of the dissenters and
radicals.

Gladstone recognized, however, that he lived in

an imperfect world, and that his goal could not be achieved.
Thus it was necessary, according to Gladstone, for the state
to be as neutral toward other religions as possible. 8
This transformation of Gladstone's beliefs and
political alliances caused many problems in assessing
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Gladstone's role in the politics of disestablishment.

Were

his motives political, religious, or some combination of the
two?

While I have chosen to focus on the political rather

than on the religious aspects of Gladstone's realization in
late 1867 that the Irish church had to be disestablished
immediately, Gladstone's views on religion are not to be
disregarded.
Religion was an important and significant aspect of
Gladstone's whole life.

One historian had gone as far as to

state that his "primary interests were religious, not
political." 9

This assessment is, in many ways, too extreme.

Gladstone had a deep interest in both religion and politics.
In 1832 he had struggled with the question of whether he
should go into the church or if he should remain in
politics; he chose to remain in politics.

The historian may

be able to separate politics from religion, but in
Gladstone's mind they were too interwoven to be pulled apart
so easily.

When Gladstone had finally decided upon the

necessity of championing Irish reform, it is not surprising
that he first acted on a religious issue.

Still, this

thesis will contend that the political issue of Irish reform
and its connection with the Fenians was the most important
issue to Gladstone in 1867 and 1868.

Whatever his feelings

were toward state-supported religions in the early 1860s,
they were not enough to prompt him to action on the question
of disestablishment.

It took the threat of widespread Irish

6

sympathy for the Fenians to convince Gladstone that there
was no time to be wasted in addressing the issue of the
Irish church.
The question is, why did Gladstone wait until 1868 to
present motions that would disestablish and disendow the
Church of Ireland, when he had had several chances to do so
before then?

Many interpretations exist, but none are

entirely complete or correct.
E. J. Feuchtwanger focuses on Gladstone's sense of
justice and fair play.

Feuchtwanger sees Gladstone's

disestablishment bill as an act of atonement for past
wrongs done to Ireland.

10

Peter Stansky has focused on

Gladstone's changing religious beliefs.

Stansky feels that

Gladstone's actions were intended to strengthen the Church
of Ireland:
• • • in Ireland the establishment was very much a
minority church, financially supported under duress
by a people of a different and antagonistic faith.
In such a situation, Gladstone believed that the
Church of Ireland would be helping itself to fi~~
strength and new life through disestablishment.
Although Stansky focuses on a different theme than
Feuchtwanger, Stansky essentially agrees with Feuchtwanger
when he states that Gladstone's appeal "rested on the use of
politics for moral ends."

12

These books, by their omission of the Fenians, have
implied that the Fenians played an insignificant role.
J. C. Beckett is more direct in his negative assessment of

the role of the Fenians in Gladstone's decision to promote
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disestablishment in 1868:
It is an error to suppose that it was Fenianism
that disposed the British public to accept the
remedial ~easures that he was shortly to put
forward. 1
While other historians have discussed the influence of
the Fenians, they do not give them much credit in their
discussions.

Gladstone's two most well known biographers,

John Morley and Philip Magnus, indicate that the Fenians
played some role in convincing Gladstone that the time for
action was near.

Morley leaves the reader with the

impression that Gladstone was waiting for public opinion to
ripen on the question of disestablishment.

Gladstone's

ability to feel the pulse and tempo of British public
opinion was proven correct "by the result." 14

Magnus, for

his part, comments that "two bomb outrages perpetrated in
England by Irish Fenian conspirators in September and
December, 1867, had impressed Gladstone without unduly
influencing him. 1115

Neither Magnus nor Morley give the

Fenians enough credit for their role in the debate on the
urgency of disestablishment.
Histories of both England and Ireland contain passages
that briefly note the importance of the Fenians.

Donald

Read in his history of England states" . • • Gladstone
regarded the Fenian outrages not as a reason for pursuing a
course of negation in Ireland, but for promoting a policy
which would seek to remove the grievances exploited by the
Fenians."

16

Patrick O'Farrell notes that the violence of

8
the Fenians "prompted the English government to make
reforms which moderates had proposed earlier as essential
17
in order to avoid violence."
E. L. Woodward is more cautious, and more
contradictory, in his approach toward the issue of the
influence of the Fenians.

Woodward states that "Gladstone's

mind was made up even before Fenianism shewed the danger of
delay; in 1868 he told Granville that, for years past, he
had been watching the sky with a strong sense of obligation
to act with the first streak of dawn."

18

Yet, later in his

book, he seems to emphasize the importance of the Fenians:
Ireland was still unreconciled to English rule,
but the failure of the leaders to obtain anything
like the support which O'Connell had secured a
generation earlier showed that, perhaps, Ireland
was not irreconcilable. The redress of agrarian
grievances, and the abolition of the privileges
of the Anglican Church, might even yet bring about
this long-delayed reconciliation. Such was the
reasoning which persuaded Gladstone to take up the
questions of Irish land tenure and the Irish Church.
The Fenian movement ~glped to convince him that
delay was dangerous.
There are dangers involved in focusing on the Fenians
and disestablishment.

The first is that a study such as

this tends to focus attention on a very narrow subject to
the exclusion of other topics.

Church disestablishment

became only a part of a package of general reform that
ultimately also included acts on land and education.
other problem is a danger that is pointed out by
E. R. Norman:
But too great an emphasis on the revolutionaries
of this decade has led many historians into a

The

9

disproportionate neglect of the other political
movements which then ran their course.
In fact,
the most substantial political feature of the
1860's was not the Fenians, but the emergence of a
coherent Liberal party in Ireland 2 Bnder the direct
patronage of the Catholic Church.
While Norman may be correct in emphasizing other groups and
organizations that were more important to long term Irish
politics, this thesis attempts to understand the short term
importance of the Fenians on Gladstone's decision to
disestablish the Irish church.
The issue of Fenianism, church disestablishment,
Gladstone, and the connection between the three is clouded
and unsure.

That fact on its own speaks eloquently for the

need of an in depth study.

21

Most of the sources already

cited briefly address the issue of Gladstone and the
Fenians.

All the authors have their individual views of

what the influence of one was upon the other.
however, go into great detail.

They do not,

A study such as this would

go a long way toward ending some of the confusion and
contradiction.
The possible benefits of this study are numerous.

The

most obvious is the light it may throw on Gladstone's
political nature.

It will not produce any startling

revelations about Gladstone's personality and politics.
A limited study of one event in 1868-1869 cannot seriously
challenge the detailed synthesis of the years of material
that make up a biography.

It can, however, support themes

that have been emphasized in other works.

The Fenians had

10
an important role in convincing Gladstone to act upon the
issue of disestablishment.

This study confirms that

Gladstone was capable of sudden, "volcanic" decisions to
act upon his newly found convictions.

As Philip Magnus

maintains:
Gladstone's iron self-mastery, which held his
volcanic energy in check, was operated by his
intelligence and by his will. He never gave
himself to any subject, whatever attractions
it held for him, until he had first convinced
himself that the time was ripe for bringing it
forward.
He believed that his instinct for
'right-timing', which his enemies called
opportunism and greed for office, was his
outstanding gift as a statesman. And the
seismic way in which that instinct sometimes
appeared to operate, was ~ measure alike of the
vehemence of his nature. 2
If the Fenians did force the English to consider Irish
reforms, what, in part, would be the benefits of such
reforms?

Again, this question touches on Gladstone's

concept of religion.

Although he had come to the conclusion

that the state did not necessarily have an obligation to
determine religious truth, religion none the less played an
important role in politics.

Without a strong moral base

on which society stabilizes, he thought society, political
and civil, could disintegrate into anarchy.

The Protestant

church in Ireland had failed to find a following among the
majority of the Irish.

The Catholic church in Ireland had

no real stake in insuring the stability of Irish society as
long as there remained an officially established and
sanctioned Church of Ireland.

The Church of Ireland became
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an albatross around the neck of the civil authorities in
Ireland.

The Catholic church in Ireland would provide a

stable and moral base for the continuance of English
government in Ireland only after the destruction of the
Church of Ireland had been accomplished.
What does this have to do with the Fenians?

The

Fenians themselves were not concerned with the religious
question.

The Fenians were primarily concerned with the

establishment of an independent Irish republic.

Why would

Fenian violence influence Gladstone to attack the Church of
Ireland?

How could disestablishment, once enacted, affect

the Fenians?

Many Englishment, Gladstone included, felt

that sympathy for the Fenians in Ireland was possible only
because of outstanding grievances.
Fenian movement waxed and waned.

English concern over the
At one moment the English

were confident that repressive acts (such as the suspension
of habeas corpus) could do the trick; while the next moment
they became morbidly insecure and despondent when Fenian
violence threatened to erupt, or when violence actually did
erupt.

Throughout the 1860s the English found themselves

confident that the Fenian movement would disappear when
their various projects failed (such as the attempted
invasions of Canada).

At other times in the 1860s the

English found themselves outraged and puzzled by the
continued violence of the Fenians--especially when that
violence found its way onto English soil, as with the
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incidents at Manchester and Clerkenwell.
Of greater significance to English statesmen, was the
effect that the Fenians had on the Irish.
were not active Fenians.

Most of the Irish

The Fenians, however, fed off

of the considerable sympathy the Irish were willing to give
any movement willing to oppose the English.

23

The Catholic

church, officially, was against all secret societies,
including the Fenians.
speak with one voice.

The Catholics, however, did not
Bishop McHale, Father Lavelle, and

a large number of parish priests found it more desirable to
either remain neutral or to show outright support for the
Fenians.

More significantly, the feeling of discontent

illustrated by the Fenians helped the Irish tb focus their
attention on issues tangential to the Fenian movement. 24
As one proponent of the Irish reform put it:
Though an organization may be ill-qesigned or
even ridiculous, or, on account of the folly,
or violence, or treachery, of those who are
responsible for its management, may come to a
speedy dissolution, if it have its origins in an
earnest and enduring feeling, it is significant
of danger--it represents more than is seen;
and di~ d~wn as it may, it ~s sure to spring
up again in some new form. 2
Disestablishment could mollify Ireland so that future groups
such as the Fenians could not find fertile ground on which
to grow.
There are several other issues connected with the
Fenian movement that this paper cannot, in more than a
cursory manner, address.

One is the ultimate consequence

13
of the reality, or appearance, of English reform occurring
only after the Irish had turned to violence.

26

This paper

will analyze whether or not Fenian violence was responsible,
in large part, for convincing the English of the need for
reform.

This paper cannot, due to its limited scope, come

to a satisfactory conclusion as to whether or not this
canonised violence was the only means of bringing the
English to the bargaining table.

An answer to that

question depends more upon Irish perceptions of what
prompted the English to support reform than it does on
the reality of what got the English to finally address
Irish grievances.
This paper attempts to provide some insights into the
nature of British political reform, especially reform that
affected Ireland.

It is important to assess the influence

of the Fenians on Gladstone.

Gladstone, after 1868, became

the champion of Irish reform, eventually embracing Home Rule
in the 1880s.

Gladstone, as the leader of the Liberal Party

for much of the nineteenth century, was responsible for
interpreting, and enacting, the desires of the English, the
Irish, and, finally, the members of the Liberal Party.

In

what manner Gladstone approached the question of reform and
under what conditions he felt it necessary to enact
proposals for reform are important.
The question is not, why did Gladstone believe in
disestablishment?

That is a separate topic.

The question

14
is, why did he come to the conclusion in late 1867 that the
time for disestablishment of the Irish church was at hand?
How did the Fenian movement influence that decision?

The

evidence supports the contention that the Fenians played a
significant role in Gladstone's decision to pursue the
question of disestablishment.

One intent of the

disestablishment bill was to undercut potential popular
support for the Fenians by granting reform that would
satisfy the majority of the Irish, and defuse the Catholic
clergy's rancorous invective and hatred of English
governance.

Gladstone hoped that once disestablishment

had been enacted, along with reforms of land tenure and
education, the Irish would be reconciled to English rule.
Once the Irish were reconciled to English rule, movements
like the Fenians would cease to pose any danger to the
security and well being of the union between England and
Ireland.

15
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CHAPTER I
DISESTABLISHMENT PROPOSAL
Introduction
When Gladstone talked of "moving upon great questions
of policy for Ireland" in 1869 1 he had in mind the questions
of disestablishment, land reform, and education.
issues were not new.

These

All of them had been enunciated as a

concern sometime before 1868.
The question of the correct relationship between the
state and the Church of Ireland had been

argu~d

at least

since 1839, when Lord John Russell steered a motion through
Parliament that set up a committee to inquire into a system
for better distribution of Church of Ireland funds.

Russell

hoped to take some of the money from the Church of Ireland
and expend it on "secular" projects in Ireland.
Gladstone had written his first book in 1837 on his
conception of the true and correct relationship between the
church and state.

At that time he had defended the

established church in Ireland.

He claimed that the Church

of Ireland was professing true religion, and in so doing it
deserved the support and protection of the state.
Gladstone's views changed quickly, however.

As early as

1845 Gladstone had stated that he could not consider himself

19
loyal to the Church of Ireland as an established church
any longer.

Nor was this attitude unique to either the

Conservatives or the Liberals.

2

Benjamin Disraeli claimed

in 1844 that the Church of Ireland was "an alien church."

3

The critical question is not, when did Gladstone change his
attitudes toward the established church in Ireland?

The

critical question is, why did Gladstone wait until 1868 to
act upon his convictions?

Why had his attitude toward the

necessity of disestablishing the Irish church changed in
late 1867?
Despite condemnation of the Irish church by
influential members of both parties, little or nothing was
done.

The potential problems associated with delay of long

overdue reform was expressed in a warning in 1844 by the
Member of Parliament for Buckinghamshire, Benjamin Disraeli.
Disraeli described Ireland as a "dense population in extreme
distress" who "inhabited an island where there was an
Established Church which was not their Church," and who had
"a territorial aristocracy, the richest of whom lived in
distant capitals."
Irish:

Disraeli summed up the problems of the

"they have a starving population, an absentee

aristocracy, and an alien Church, and, in addition, the
weakest Executive in the world."

Disraeli finished his

speech by posing a question, and answering it himself:
Well, then, what would hon. Gentlemen say if they
were reading of a country in that position? They
would say at once, the remedy is revolution. But
the Irish [can] not have a revolution; and why?

20

Because Ireland [is] connected with another and more
powerful country. Then what [is] the consequence?
The connection with England thus became the cause
of the present state of Ireland.
If the connection
with England prevented a revolution, and a
revolution were the only remedy, England
logically [is] in the odious position o~ being
the cause of all the misery in Ireland.
Although Disraeli's warning was not heeded, and no action
was taken on any of the problems that he had described, his
question and analyses were resurrected 19 years later when
the question of the position of the Church of Ireland was
reopened by the member for Swansea, Lewis Dillwyn.
Parliamentary Action And The Church of Ireland
After years of sporadic efforts and talk, Parliament
in the 1860s became the battleground where the issue of
disestablishment was fought.

How the issue came to be

introduced, and its transformation from a request for a
select committee to look into the question of Temporalities
to a call for disestablishment, are critical to an
understanding of the influences on Gladstone.

Gladstone

was Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1863, and was present
during many of the debates.

Indeed, he was involved in

several of the debates, as we shall see.
those debates:

We need to turn to

first, to see what the issues were, and,

second, to see if and how they influenced Gladstone.
it will be possible to evaluate the influence of the
Fenians.

Then
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Dillwyn's Motion, 1863.

Dillwyn's motion was, in

comparison to later motions dealing with the Church of
Ireland, timid and restrained.

Dillwyn moved for a select

committee to "inquire how far the present distribution of
endowments for religious purposes throughout Ireland may be
so amended as most to conduce to the welfare of all classes
of Her Majesty's Irish Subjects. 115

Dillwyn explained that

the reason he was bringing up the question in Parliament was
due to its difficulty; he felt that only governmental action
could secure the necessary reform. 6
Dillwyn's speech, however, questioned more than the
use of church endowments.

Dillwyn claimed that the Church

of Ireland could only be maintained for two

r~asons:

success of its mission in Ireland, or because of political
necessity.

Dillwyn felt that neither of these goals had

been achieved.
Dillwyn felt that the Church of Ireland was a source
of English weakness.

He claimed that it alienated the Irish

members of Parliament, that it was an international
embarrassment, and that it was a drain on the resources of
England.

8

Furthermore, Dillwyn claimed, the Church of

Ireland had failed as a missionary church.

Dillwyn stated

that in the province of Dublin, for instance, there had
been 295,845 members of the Church of Ireland in 1844; in
1861 that number had dropped to 236,519. 9

The Church of

Ireland, according to Dillwyn, had no claim on the loyalty
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of either the Irish or Parliament based solely on the
merits of its success as either a church or as an instrument
of the state.
Dillwyn also doubted that the Church of Ireland could
be maintained because of political necessity.

Dillwyn felt

that questions about the position of the Irish church were
long overdue because of recent turbulence within Ireland-turbulence that was mainly attributable to the existence of
the Church of Ireland.

10

Discontent in Ireland could be

overcome only if the English government would act quickly:
In England ministers of religion of all
denominations [are] the best allies of the
Government in the preservation of order, and
they [are] prominent in every movement for the
promotion of education and prosperity of the
people. But that [is] not the case in Ireland,
because the Catholic priest [feels] himself
aggrieved by the maintenance of the Church
Establishment, and [can] not be expected to be
an ally of the Government in the preservation
of order. 1
Since Dillwyn's ultimate objectives went beyond the
question of the use of religious endowments, why did he
limit his motion to only that question?

For one, Dillwyn

realized that any motion that dealt with the official
establishment of the Church of Ireland questioned the Act
of Union that had created it.

As Dillwyn noted, the Act of

Union required that the Churches of England and Ireland be
united.

Dillwyn also noted, however, that the Act of Union

did not prevent questioning of the use of endowments. 12
Dillwyn's motion was a warning shot, a shot that was
quickly turned into a protracted seige.
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The other reason for Dillwyn's timidity was his
awareness that he was receiving little support from Irish
Catholics or from the Irish M.P.'s.

The Irish Catholics,

for their part, were not yet organized.

13

Only after the

National Association had been formed did Catholics in
Ireland take up the cry of disestablishment in earnest.
The Irish M.P.'s may have felt

tha~

14

they could not discuss

matters pertaining to the Irish church because of the oath
they had taken to preserve and support the Union. 15
Dillwyn had to proceed cautiously.

For one, his

question touched upon the fundamental basis for the official
relationship between England and Ireland:
Union.

the Act of

Secondly, Dillwyn was unsure of his support, despite

his claim that the Irish were unhappy with their present
condition. 16
Dillwyn's first motion is important for two reasons.
First, because it put the issue before the House for the
first time since 1859,
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thereby forcing Parliament to

think about an issue that had seemed dormant for a long
time.

With the advantage of hindsight, we now know that

this was the first of several measures spanning the 1860s
that eventually led up to the successful bill in 1869 that
disestablished and partially disendowed the Irish church.
Second, it is important because it introduced one of the
critical arguments in favor of disestablishment:

that

unless there was a solid commitment for Irish reform, the
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Irish could not be counted on to remain loyal to the union
between England and Ireland.

His statement that England

needed a loyal Catholic clergy to help maintain order
touched a responsive chord four years later in many
Englishmen who were puzzled and perplexed by the phenomenon
(as they saw it) of Fenianism.
The debate on Dillwyn's motion was held May 19th and
was indefinitely adjourned until Parliament was officially
ended in July of that same year without any action being
taken.

Eighteen sixty-four proved to be a quiet year for

Parliamentary action regarding the Church of Ireland.
Parliamentary debate, however, was not quiet for long.
Early in 1865 the issue was again brought before Parliament,
again by Dillwyn.
Dillwyn's Second Motion, 1865.

On March 28, 1865,

Dillwyn introduced a new measure which stated that "in the
opinion of this House, the present position of the Irish
Church Establishment is unsatisfactory, and (this house)
calls for the early attention of Her Majesty's
Government. 1118

This measure was much more strongly worded

than the first.
The issues that were brought out in the debate on
Dillwyn's second motion closely paralleled the issues
debated during the first motion.

Dillwyn started the

debate by stating that the revenues of the Irish church
were 586,428 pounds per year, all of which went to a church
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that ministered to 600,000 Anglicans.

The majority of the

Catholics, all 4.5 million, got nothing except for one tiny
19
grant to the University of Maynooth.
The respective
numbers of the different religions were cited again; the
Church of Ireland existed only to minister to a minority
population.
Dillwyn realized that his motion could be construed as
an attack on the Church of England:

"Before entering on a

discussion of the question," Dillwyn "wished to clear the
issue from all irrelevant matter, and particularly to
dispel one error--," that he had "brought the subject
forward as an enemy of the Established Church in England. 1120
Dillwyn argued that the foundations of the two churches
were completely different.

The Church of England rested

on, and was supported by, the good will of the English
people.

In that sense the Church of England was a popular

church.

Dillwyn noted, conversely, that the Irish church

"rested on a totally different foundation," and that if it
were to rest solely on the good will and consent of the
people of Ireland it would collapse at once. 21

The Irish

church rested solely, as far as Dillwyn was concerned, on
"power" and "bayonets." 22
Dillwyn and his supporters proceeded to examine the
mission of the Church of Ireland.

There were, they said,

two possible missions.

One, that the Church of Ireland

was a national church:

a church established to serve the
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citizens of the country.

Dillwyn declared that the

definition of an "established church is one that of an
establishment by the general consent of the community for
the administration of religion."
was a complete failure.
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As a national church it

The statistics gave the lie to the

Church of Ireland as a national church.

As Grant Duff

noted, it was the:
Church of the great landowners, the bankers, the
merchants.
It is, so far as I know, the only
church in Christendom of which it has been truly
said that it takes for its motto~ I fill the rich,
and the poor I send empty away.' 4
1

The proponents of the measure, as they had in 1863,
derided the notion that the Church of Ireland had succeeded
.
.
as a missionary
c h urc h • 25
the opposite.

Grant Duff, in fact, argued just

Duff claimed that the Church of Ireland had

"created about 4 1/2 millions of the most determined
Catholics in the world."
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If the Irish church had failed in its official
mission, was there any other reason for maintaining its
ascendancy?

Perhaps the Irish church could be maintained as

a political bulwark of the English government in Ireland.
As in 1863, this possible explanation for the Church of
Ireland's existence encountered derision from those who
would see its destruction.

Far from being a source of

stability, the Irish church was condemned as a source of
weakness and dissension.

Grant Duff, in explaining why

Irish Catholics seemed so aggressive in comparison with
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their co-religionists in France and Spain, opined that "it
is simply because the sagacity of English statesmen took
care that, even after the penal laws were abolished, there
should remain one grievance, which would fulfil the
proverbial functions of a moderate persecution in
stimulating religious zeal. 1127

Dillwyn claimed that "it

might be said that it [the Irish church] was instituted in
order to obtain influence over the people of a country, and
so to facilitate government; but if it had failed in
converting the people, it must necessarily prove not an
assistance but a serious impediment in the way of
administration. 1128

Nor was the administration of Ireland

all that was at stake.

If Irish grievances were allowed to

continue, the very integrity of Parliament would be at
stake:
He [the O'Donoghue] did not, however, hesitate
to say that the effect of so persistent a refusal
to redress a crying and acknowledged grievance had
been to impress the great mass of people of Ireland
with the idea that there was no reliance to be
placed on the action of Parliament, and to cause
them to regard with suspicion the man who told
them that they ought to have every confidence in
the wisdom and justice of the House of Commons.
And when the House reflected on the length of time
during which the question of the Irish Church
Establishment had been under the notice of the
Legislature, without any remedy being provided,
they must, he thought, admit that it was not
unnatural the P2~ple of Ireland would come to
the conclusion.
The delays in granting a solution to the problem of the
Irish church could only encourage the Irish to find
extra-parliamentary methods of attaining satisfaction.
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The proponents of the measure also addressed the
question of what effect a revision of the status of the
Church of Ireland would have upon the Act of Union.

Grant

Duff pointed out that a Tory government had already
weakened the act when they had amended the fourth article.
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Duff was amused by the concern shown about preserving the
Act of Union against any more changes:
This exaggerated veneration for the Irish Union
sounds strange in the ears of a Scotchman when he
remembers how the Scottish Union fared.
How? Is
it possible to maintain that the temporalities of
the Irish Church were considered more sacred at the
time of the union with Ireland than the heritable
jurisdictions at the time of the union with
Scotland? And did not the heritable jurisdictions
go the same road 3~at we hope to see the Irish
Establishment go?
Duff clearly felt that Parliament, for no good reason, was
being very selective about how they viewed the inviolability
of Acts of Union.
The issue of the Irish church was admittedly delicate
and difficult.

The O'Donoghue noted "that the maintenance

of the Established Church in Ireland in its present
condition had already been discussed with all the force,
eloquence, wit, and logic which could be brought to bear
upon it, and all to no purpose. 1133

Arguments were made,

echoing sentiments voiced in 1863, that the Irish, the
international community, and inflential members of English
government had all voiced dissatisfaction with the Church of
Ireland.
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The issue, according to the proponents of the

motion, was pressing.

An answer was needed urgently.

The
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O'Donoghue, who had risen to second Dillwyn's motion, ended
his speech with an impassioned plea:
It was of the utmost importance to know what
course Her Majesty's government intended to
take on the present occasion--the noble Lord
at the head of the government (Viscount Palmerston),
the right hon. Gentleman and the Home Secretary (Sir
George Grey), and the Secretary of State for the
Colonies (Mr. Cardwell) having, in published
speeches, given their adhesion in every essential
particular to the first part of the Mo3~on of the
hon. Member for Swansea (Mr. Dillwyn).
If they agreed with t~5 first portion how could
they reject the latter?
If they opposed it, he was anxious to hear what
reasons they would give.
If they said the time was
not come for action, he would ask them was the time
not always come for acting with justice. He hopes
Her Majesty's Government upon the present occasion
would show that they were not afraid to take a just
course.
If they acted in the spirit which had
dictated their speeches, he was certain that not only
would they have a large gathering in that House,
but their vote would commend itself to the great
majority of the Irish people, and also to large
numbers of persons in England. A vigorous, just,
and prompt course taken at this particular moment
would have a most beneficial effect, not only upon
the State of Ireland, bu3 perhaps, upon the future
7
prospects of the Empire.
Arguments made in favor of action were to no avail.
Sir George Grey, speaking for the Liberal government,
refused to be drawn into the quagmire that was the question
of the condition of the Church of Ireland.

Grey admitted

that, "If, as a mere abstract question, I were asked to say
that the present position of the Irish Church is not
satisfactory, I should probably not differ much from the
hon. Gentleman."
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Grey, however, felt that more evil than

good would be accomplished by questioning the status of
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to the Irish Church. 39

Grey closed his speech by stating:

I am not surprised at the discontent existing
from the cause I have mentioned, and I should be
glad to redress it. But it is impossible to do
without producing evils of far greater magnitude
than those which now exist, and without involving
in dissensions which would be totally destructive
of peace and progress. For these reasons,
believing that the subject advowed by those
who have brought forward the Resolution is one
which could not be attained without great
mischief, being of opinion that no practical
grievance exists, and that in attempting to
redress the theoretical grievance, a great
shock would be given to our laws and institutions,
I can have no hesitation on the pa~ 0 of the
Government in opposing the motion.
What sort of mischief was Grey afraid of?

Dillwyn and

Duff both stated that the measure was intended as an inquiry
only; no follow-up action or legislation was mandated. 41
Yet once the government undertook an official inquiry, how
could they not act upon their discoveries?

Especially,

as The O'Donoghue had so impertinently pointed out, many of
the highest members of government had expressed dissatisf action with the Church of Ireland.

The government sought to

avoid the whole problem by claiming that no real grievance
existed.
But what if a real grievance had existed?
government was forced into action?

What if the

What had Grey meant when

he had talked of a "great shock" to England's "laws and
institutions?"
an inquiry?
predictable:

What if the government had gone ahead with

The results of that inquiry were almost
the present condition of the established

Church of Ireland was unsatisfactory.

What action would
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be taken?

Sir George Grey had declared himself in favor

of concurrent endowment. 42

Concurrent endowment, however,

was not what Dillwyn and his supporters had in mind.

They

had already stated that the established Church of Ireland
was a festering wound that poisoned and enraged the minds
of Irish Catholics.

Grant Duff condensed 300 years of

English miscues and misrule into one succinct statement:
During the last 300 years, you have had three
policies in Ireland. From Queen Elizabeth to
William III, there was a policy of persecutions-that failed. From William III down to Catholic
Emancipation, there was a policy of ascendency-that failed too. Then timidly and tentatively
you turned toward general endowment, and in 1845
Sir Robert Peel took a considerable step in that
direction.
It soon became clear, however,
that the c~~ntry would not follow you on that
road • • •
The time for concurrent endowment had come and gone.

That

left only disestablishment.
Debate was adjourned until May 2nd.

On April 28th, in

response to a question from Walpole, Dillwyn stated that he
was not ready to continue with the question on the 2nd. 44
On May 12th, in response to a query by Dillwyn, Sir George
Grey said that the calendar for the rest of the parliamentary session was too full, and that there was not time
enough to address the issue.

The debate in Parliament on

the Irish church was finished for 1865.
Gray's Motion, 1866.

Many members of Parliament could

not have been too shocked when, on April 10, 1866, Sir John
Gray reintroduced discussion of the Irish church.

Nor, by
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this time, would there have been surprise at Gray's
admonition that he spoke the sentiments "of those who act
with me, when I say that we are fully determined never to
let this question rest until Church ascendancy is abolished,
and until perfect religious equality is established in
Ireland. 1145

The language of the new motion was stronger

than the language of the 1865 motion (just as the language
of the 1865 motion was stronger than that of the 1863
motion).

Gray moved "that the position of the Established

Church in Ireland is a just cause of dissatisfaction to the
people of that country, and urgently demands the
consideration of parliament. 1146

The debate on the Church

of Ireland had been reopened.
Gray condemned the Church of Ireland with very severe
language.

Gray claimed that the only "pretence" upon which

the Irish church could be defended was that it was:
• an old wrong, and old injustice, and old
abuse, [that] has continued for so lengthened a
period that there would be serious difficulty in
removing that grievance • • • that there [are], in
fact, certain established rights of injustice, and
that these rights of injustice must be preserved
and conserved because of their long continuance. 47
Gray went on to explain that "everyman in Ireland," except
those people who were intimately connected with the Church
itself, "admits that the Established Church of Ireland has
failed most signally, failed as to every one of the purposes
for which it was imported into that country. 1148

Gray

finished his statements of general condemnation, and said
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that, since this Parliament had seen so many new members,
he would repeat some of the facts that had been used in the
49
earlier debates.
Gray and the other proponents proceeded to reiterate
many of the same themes that had been stressed in earlier
debates.

The 1861 census was again quoted.

Gray and

Mr. Pollard-Urquhart, using those statistics, claimed that
the Church of Ireland had failed as a missionary church.
In short, none of the old complaints had disappeared.so
Neither had the argument disappeared that the Irish
church was disruptive to the civil peace of Ireland.
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Gray asked if Ireland and the Irish should be happy and
equal citizens in Great Britain, or:
• • • shall we have a great surging mass of
discontent created, fostered, and rendered active
by the continuance of unequal laws--of laws which,
if they do not actually injure the person, affect
the social position and the future progress in life
by putting the brand of degradation and of
inferiority upon one class, and givig~ an odious
and hateful ascendancy to the other.
Colonel Greville, who seconded the motion, invited the House
to "assist in removing a cause of calamity to Ireland and
the constant source of its disaffection."

Colonel Greville

further added that "might it not be said of England and
Ireland • • • that the nations are two, because the Churches
are one?"
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Disaffection of the Irish was still a major

issue in the discussions on the Church of Ireland.
issues, however, came to the fore as well.

Other
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In this debate the proponents of the measure spent
much more time answering the criticisms of the Conserva4
tives. One argument that the Conservatives useds was that
in reality the Church of Ireland was the true heir to the
Catholic Church of St. Patrick.

The O'Donoghue answered

by claiming that it did not matter in the least whether or
not st. Patrick had been a Protestant.

What mattered was

that the vast majority of the Irish were still Catholic and
that they had never "embraced" the Protestant religion.SS
Colonel Greville argued, in response to Conservative
concerns that disestablishment would affect the Act of
Union, that the Parliament had already "fiddled with the
Act."

The first time was in 1833 when they stippressed

10 bishoprics and 2 archbishoprics; the second in 1834 when
Parliament suspended "numerous dignities and benefices;"
and the third time in 1838 when Parliament "extinguished"
2S% of the tithes.s 6
The supporters of the measure also made use of a new
argument.

Colonel Greville argued that disestablishment had

been tried, with success, in Canada.

Canada had, according

to Greville, disestablished the state church for the sake of
"social harmony."s

7

If Parliament could give control of the

church to the Canadians, who promptly disestablished it, why
could not Parliament disestablish the Irish church?
Dillwyn's motions had been very tentative steps
toward disestablishment.

As the debates continued and more

35

thought was given to what to do with the church once it was
disestablished, some small differences appeared among the
proponents of the measure.

Sir John Gray and The O'Donoghue

were for complete disendowment.

The O'Donoghue claimed

that the clergy would not accept church endowment and that
the ecclesiastical revenues were the property of the Irish
.

na t ion.
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Colonel Greville on the other hand argued that

for political reasons it was impossible for the Catholics
to accept money from the State:
They would lose caste if they did.
It would
diminish their influence with the people and it
would be a misfortune if their influence were lost;
because, when the Irish people cease to have respect
for the authority of religion it will not be long
59
before they throw off the authority of the State.
Mr. Pollard-Urquhart agreed that the clergy would not, or
could not, accept state money, but he wondered if the money
could not be spent in part in increased grants to Maynooth
and to the Regium Donum.
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Whatever differences may have

appeared between some of the supporters of the measure,
they were all in agreement that resolution of those
differences could wait.

The issue was complicated, but what

was more important was "the right to worship God according
to their consciences, and the right of being perfectly free
and unfettered because of religious opinion."

61

The proponents of the measure were to be disappointed
again.

Chichester Fortescue, speaking for the government,

claimed that:
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• • • few will blame them [the government],
because I think few will maintain that public
opinion has attained so clear and so ripe a state
on this subject as would enable the Government to
know, first of all, what is possible, in the next
place, what would be most acceptable to those who
are most interested in the matter--namely, the people
of Ireland, and es~2cially the Roman Catholic
people of Ireland.
Fortescue also claimed that the resolution would not be one
of discussion, but would compel immediate action on the part
of the Government.
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Fortescue did say, no doubt knowing

he was engaging in a fantasy, that he hoped that the Church
of Ireland would voluntarily give up some of its
endowments--not to be given to the priests, but to be given
to "some body fairly representing the Roman Catholic Church
as a whole. 1164
The supporters of Gray's motion did not go away
completely empty-handed.

Fortescue did make statements in

favor of their motion that were much stronger in their
support than past statements had been.

Fortescue started

out by saying that he confessed that he approached the
"resolution personally with feelings of sympathy and
concurrence. 1165

He further admitted that:

If it does not now press hardly in its daily
effects upon the peasantry and fairness of the
country, yet (it now) influences and colours
every subject of public discussion, and most
deeply affects the minds of the most educ~6ed
and intelligent portion of the community.
Fortescue further refused to acknowledge that any of the
arguments that the Conservatives had in defence of the
Church of Ireland were valid.

Fortescue claimed that the
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arguments which "support and justify the existence of the
Established Church in England condemn the existence of the
Established Church in Ireland."
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Fortescue ended his

speech by admitting that he did not know when the time for
action would come, but that he wished "it well," and that
he wished it "God speed."
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Despite Fortescue's encouraging tone, the supporters
of the motion were not entirely pleased.

They had hoped for

some sort of tangible government support, and all they had
received in return were words of potential support for
sometime in the unforeseen future.

Mr. Pollard-Urquhart,

who followed Fortescue in speaking, allowed his bitterness
over the Government's refusal to back the motion to show:
The right hon. Gentleman has said, indeed, that
public opinion is not sufficiently ripe to enable
any Government to take it in hand (the issue of
Church disestablishment). Why, Sir, what progress
could our legislation ever make if Government were
never to deal with any ques6~on till they thought
public opinion ripe for it?
Pollard-Urquhart went on to remind the Liberals that the
Whigs had backed free-trade even when there was no public
support, losing office in consequence in 1841.

Yet the

Whigs had been vindicated seven years later in 1848 when
they were re-elected on a free-trade platform.

The

Government benches remained quiet for the rest of the
debate.
Gray's Second Motion, 1867.

On the 7th of May, 1867,

Sir John Gray brought to the floor of Parliament another
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motion with respect to the Irish church.

His motion asked

"that this House will, on Wednesday the 29th day of this
instant May, resolve itself into a committee to consider
the Temporalities and Priviledges of the Established Church
in Ireland." 70

Sir John was not overly hopeful, however,

that the issue would find favor with either party:
It would seem as if the leaders at both sides of
the House [shrank] from dealing with this question,
which is, no doubt, one of peculiar difficulty--it
would seem as if they [are] anxious to avoid dealing
with it at all • • • The leaders on the other side
of the House do not feel disposed to take it up,
possibly because they feel that they are too short
a time in office. The leaders upon this side of
the House do not seem disposed to take it up
~ecause ~h~y f711 that they are too short a time
in opposition.
Gray hoped, however, that the House would look favorably
upon his motion and go into a committee--not to endorse
any particular course of action--but to come to grips with
the problem of a Protestant church forced onto a
predominantly Catholic nation. 72
The arguments used against the Church of Ireland were
those of the previous debates.

The proponents of the

measure concentrated a goodly bulk of their attention on the
political ramifications of the establishment.

Mr. Murphy

argued that the Church of Ireland had been established for
political, rather than religious reasons. 73

Sir John

claimed that the Irish church was a chief grievance of the
Irish.

Gray further attacked the members of Parliament for

dragging their feet.

He pointed out that Earl Russell had
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only half-heartedly addressed the issue of the Irish church
at a time of serious Irish discontent.
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Gray asked

Parliament if they wished church disestablishment to be
carried in the same way that the issue of Catholic
emancipation had been resolved:
Do the leaders mean to intimate to us who sit
below the gangway that we are to get up an agitation
somewhat analogous to the angry agita7~on which
carried Catholic Emancipation • • • ?
Beyond asking what it would take to move the leaders
of the two parties to address the issue of the Irish church,
the proponents of the motion gave dire predictions of what
would happen if the Irish church was left alone.

Sir John

Gray quoted Sir George Lewis "in one of his most recently
edited publications:"
No improvements in the material economy of the
Established church, in the distribution of the
revenues, or the discipline of its clergy, tend
to lessen the sense of grievance arising from
this source, the objection if on principle, not
of degree, and nothing short of perfect equality
in the treatment of all religious sects will
satisfy the person whose discontentment springs from
this source. The effect of the reference in
question is that the whole body of the Roman
Catholics in Ireland are more or less alienated
from the Government, the author of their wrong,
and filled with jealousy ~gd ill will toward the
more favored Protestants.
Colonel Greville, who seconded the motion, claimed that "it
was the existence of this grievance and others that gave
discontented agitators their influence over the people of
Ireland, and if it were not for them their agitation would
be without effect." 77
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Influential Liberals were coming ever closer to being
in agreement with the radicals and non-conformists who
favored the immediate disestablishment of the Irish church.
Chichester Fortescue claimed that "every argument put
forward in support of the Establishment here amounted to a
condemnation of it there."
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Fortescue agreed with the

proponents of the measure that the existence of the
established church was a cause of Irish discontent.
Fortescue said, on the issue of discontent and the
established church, "I believe that until the ascendancy
which at present exists in that respect is done away with,
we shall not have peace, contentment, or prosperity in the
1 an d • "79
Despite words of encouragement, Fortescue and other
Liberals did not feel that they could support the measure
as a party.

As serious as the discontent was, it was not

nearly as bad as Irish discontent had been in the past.
Fortescue claimed that the Fenian movement was not as
"injurious" nor as bad as the "civil and religious war of
1798," nor was the discontent as bad as the state of
Ireland 30 years before the current debate when,
• • • the savage conflict took place at
Carrickshock and Rathcormac. As compared with
the state of feelings which existed at those
periods, the House [can] look with satisfaction
at the support received by the Executive from the
middle and upper classes during the Fenian
disturbances.
It [is] impossible to look at
these things without recognizing that the policy
of justice and wisdom on which the House entered
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a few years ago had borne fruit, and that its
results ought to encouB3ge Parliament to proceed
in the same direction.
Calm, deliberate consideration was the order of the day.
Fortescue argued, in agreement with Gladstone,
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that the

issue had not reached a stage at which it could be dealt
with:
• • • though its vast and pressing importance was
becoming everyday much clearer to the mind of this
country.
The circumstances of Ireland, the
intolerable and continued presence of sedition
and disaffection in that country [calls] for §
2
conscientious examination by Parliament • • •
Fortescue said that he would "hail the day when they could
arrive at a settlement of this question."
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Fortescue,

however, admitted that that day had not yet arrived and
that the best he could do was give his assent to the motion
.
t e mem b er. 84
as a pr1va

The proponents of the measure had

come extremely close to getting some sort of official
recognition for it.

Yet prominent Liberals, when it came

time to declare their intentions, backed away from
wholehearted support for disestablishment.

They were

willing to support an inquiry into the subject--but only
as individuals, not as a party.
The proponents of disestablishment had used several
arguments in favor of their motions.

They had argued that

the great majority of the Irish were not Anglicans, but
rather that they were Catholics, and they had argued that
the Church of Ireland had failed in its mission as a
missionary church.

More importantly, the proponents of
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disestablishment had stated that the Church of Ireland was
a primary cause of Irish discontent.

Further, they pointed

out that Irish discontent was a threat to the legislative
union between the two countries.

The leaders of the

Liberal Party had concurred with almost all the arguments
made against the Irish church.

The leaders of the Liberal

Party, however, did not agree that Ireland was as
discontented as the proponents of disestablishment claimed.
The Liberal Party refused to take up the cause of
disestablishment because they felt that the condition of
Ireland did not warrant their addressing an issue that was
so complicated and volatile.

It was obvious that support

of the Liberal Party could be had only if Ireland showed
signs of pervasive discontent.
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CHAPTER II
THE UNSYMPATHETIC REACTION:

THE CONSERVATIVES

Dillwyn's motion in 1863 met with little sympathy from
either the Liberals or the Conservatives.

As long as the

Liberals were in power they did little to help along any
schemes that involved revision of the status of the Church
of Ireland.

The Liberals did not, however, deny that the

current position of the Church of Ireland was unsatisfactory.
They simply did not want to involve themselves in a problem
that had caused the downfall of several ministries.

1

Nor were all Conservatives pleased with the
relationship between England and the Church of Ireland.
Disraeli, in his speech before Parliament in 1845,

2

had

claimed that the existence of an "alien church," along with
the problems of absentee landlords and chronic poverty,
were justifications for a revolution.
Other Conservatives were unhappy with the Church of
Ireland as well.

In 1853 Lord Stanley wrote a pamphlet on

the church rate question.

In his diary he noted:

I inserted, tentatively, some passages adverse to
the general principle of Establishment of a
ecclesiastical kind: but confined this to theory,
though it may be that a practical apglication to
the Irish Church is not far distant.
Two weeks later, Lord Stanley again noted his lack of
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satisfaction:
Moore brought on the subject of the Irish Church:
Lord John strongly opposed all inquiry, or attempt
at change:
I did not vote, the permanent maintenance
of the Irish Establishment cannot be defended: but
it is reasonable and expedient to wait until the
cessation of emigration shall have settled the
relati¥e numerical strength of the two creeds and
races.
Lord Stanley's hope that the problem would resolve itself
was altogether too sanguine.

Nine years later the question

of the relationship between England and the Church of
Ireland was again making itself felt:
(Talk) with Sir G. Lewis, chiefly on points of
history, not much of present affairs: the only
thing he said bearing on live politics was that
in his eyes the real difficulty of the day was
the Irish Church. While it remained there
appeared no chance of the Catholics being
satisfied, yet to reduce would do no good, and
to abolish it wholly would be impossible, the
country not being ripe for the voluntary
system, and the middle classes looking on the
Irish Church in particular as the def5nce of
Protestantism. In all this I assent.
Nine months later the issue was tentatively introduced by
Dillwyn.
Lord Stanley's statements are intriguing.

They show

the general reticence felt in dealing with Irish affairs;
the hope that, if enough time went by, the changing
circumstances would solve the problems.

In this case

Stanley hoped that emigration would eventually solve the
problem of having an officially established Protestant
church in a land that was predominantly Catholic.
Lord Stanley, however, was not representative of the
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Conservative Party; he was very close to the Whigs in
sentiment.

He noted in 1864 that he felt there was little

difference between Conservatives and moderate Whigs.

6

Whatever qualms he may have had about the Church of Ireland,
others were quick to defend its existence.

When Dillwyn

introduced his first motion, it was the Conservatives who
most strongly opposed it.
Dillwyn's First Motion - 1863
The job of defending the Irish church fell on the
shoulders of James Whiteside, M.P. for the University of
Dublin.

Whiteside opened his attack by questioning the

motives of those who were behind the motion (despite
Dillwyn's claims that he had no ulterior motives).
Whiteside was convinced that this attack on the Church
of Ireland was really a preliminary move against the
Church of England.

Whiteside claimed that the "hon.

Gentleman" had made "a political reputation by nibbling
at the Church of England."

7

Whiteside further attacked the measure because of what
he considered its faulty attempt at mollifying Irish
opinion.

He doubted that the Irish were that dissatisfied:

"I believe that Irishmen are much less discontented and less
quarrelsome than people generally in this country imagine."

8

In fact, Whiteside was amazed, given Dillwyn's statement
about Catholic unrest, that he had heard nothing from the
Catholic M.P.'s.

Whiteside claimed that "it is a remarkable
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fact that his motion is not brought forward or suggested as
far as I am aware, by the Roman Catholic Members of this
House." 9
Whiteside also attacked the question of the relative
strengths of the various denominations.

Whiteside first

claimed that the number of Protestant churches in Ireland
had grown. 10

He further wanted to know the source of

Dillwyn's statistics.

Whiteside could not question the

results of the 1861 census, but he could, and did, question
the statistics for 1834 (with which Dillwyn compared the
Church in 1861), since there was no census in 1834.
Whiteside questioned the source and veracity of Dillwyn's
. f ormat1on.
.
11
in

Whiteside, however, knew that the 1861

census figures in themselves were damning, and tried to
belittle their importance by claiming that he agreed "with
Burke that it will be a bad day for mankind when great
principles come to be decided by numerical majorities." 12
Whiteside attacked the measure because of its possible
effects on the Union, and that "the very fact that the
Church in Ireland has existed for centuries, and that it is
incorporated in the Constitution of the country, is a
powerful argument in favor of its preservation." 13

This

argument was one which, in time, became the Conservatives
strongest argument against disestablishment.
Whiteside 1 s major argument, however, was that the
Church of Ireland represented "true" religion. 14

On this
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issue Whiteside felt he had his most telling point:

an

attack on the Church of Ireland was an attack on the
accomplishments of the Reformation:
But I will add, because I do not wish to conceal
it, that it is mainly to be defended because it is
connected with the Reformation.
It burst the
fetters that enchained the human mind.
It taught
people to think, and shook the powers of darkness
and of evil; from that moment the Church of
Ireland has held up the lamp of truth.
It may
15
have been obscured, but has never been quenched.
Despite the lack of action in 1864, Lord Stanley did
note that the issue had not gone away.

When he went into

the smoking room in the House of Commons, he:
• • • found Bright, declaiming, as is his custom,
to a circle of friends:
Ireland the subject: he
said no good would be done until the estates were
divided, tenant right given, the Irish Church
done away, the revenues ~~rtly secularized, partly
divided among all sects.
Despite Bright's conviction that something had to be done,
no action was taken until 1865--the Conservatives had a year
before they had to think about the issue of the Irish
church.
Dillwyn's Second Motion - 1865
The Conservatives were more worried in 1865 than they
had been in 1863.

Rumors were drifting about that the Whig

government was going to support Dillwyn in his efforts:
There having been sidely circulated a report
that ministers intended supporting Dillwyn's motion
on the Irish Church, I asked Sir c. [Wood] if there
wasn't any truth in it? He said, 'none,' that the
subject had not even been seriously discussed, so
far as he knew--that for himself he thought the
Irish Establishment an abomination, and believed
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most public men did so, by~ to attempt to meddle
with it would be madness.
wood went on to reassure Stanley that "he was not aware of
any intention to support Dillwyn even indirectly.

Certainly

no joint action would be taken by the cabinet. 1118

This must

have soothed some of the concerns that the Conservatives
would have felt over a battle on the Church of Ireland.
When the measure came up for debate, however, the
Conservatives had one of their more capable members,
Gathorne Hardy (later Lord Cranbrook), speak against it.
Hardy started out in much the same vein as Whiteside had
in 1863 and claimed that disestablishment of the Church
of England was the real goal.

19

Hardy catalogued the defects of the measure--some of
which repeated arguments made by Whiteside in 1863.
doubted that the Irish were that discontented:

Hardy

"The hon.

Member for Swansea speaks of the Church of Ireland as being
propped up by bayonets.

Surely that is a fiction which

can hardly exist even in the mind of the hon. Gentleman. 1120
Hardy even went so far as to claim that the Irish peasantry
looked upon the Protestant pastors as their friends. 21
Hardy, however, was not so foolhardy as to say that
there was no discontent in Ireland at all.

Hardy felt that

the discontent in Ireland existed mainly because of their
impoverishment.

Hardy could, for that reason, remark, "Is

it [disestablishment] to bring peace?

We have been told so
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before, but it is not by surrendering principles that you
can bring peace."

22

Unlike Whiteside, however, Hardy was more concerned
with the effect that disestablishment would have upon the
Act of Union.

The Act of Union had been forged as an

inseparable bond between England and the Church of Ireland.
"The Union, therefore, in reference to the Church was, it
seems to me, one of the most solemn obligations that was
ever entered into."
views.

23

Hardy was not rigid in his religious

If one of Britain's colonies did not want an

established church, that was their right.
did not have that freedom:

Ireland, however,

its church was established.

Independence and freedom of action seem to me the
right of the Colonial Churches which are not
established, and they should only be limited with
regard to the Church of England and Ireland so
far as is absolutely necessary in consequence of
her union with the State. That union must, to
some extent, affect her liberty, but there is a
large compensation in the continued recognition
of a Nat~~nal religion, and its inestimable
results.
Hardy's statement did not preclude all reforms of the Irish
church--as long as they were minimal.

Hardy did not

condone, however, an attack that threatened the existence
of the church:

an attack on the Church of Ireland, reasoned

Hardy, was an attack on the union between England and
Ireland.
Gray's First Motion - 1866
The Conservatives were no happier with the 1866 measure

55
than they had been with the motions of 1863 and 1865.
Their attack on the 1866 motion closely resembled their
attacks on the earlier motions.

Mr. Whiteside claimed that

the "important majority" of Ireland was Protestant and that
to disestablish the Irish church would leave this majority
without any important concessions--concessions tnat were
necessary if Protestants were to continue to govern
Ireland. 25

Mr. Whiteside further argued, as did Pell Dawson,

that the Church of Ireland represented "true" religion. 26
But to their defense of the Act of Union they now added the
issue of property.

Whiteside asked Parliament if they were

"aware that when you are asked to disturb the Established
Church in the possession of her property, you are asked to
overthrow the Act of Settlement?" 27
The Conservatives did not agree with the proponents
of the measure that it was all that necessary.

Further,

they saw disestablishment as only the beginning of Catholic
demands.

The Conservatives queried when Catholic demands

were going to stop.

Whiteside quoted Lord Plunkett, who

had promised that Catholics in Ireland would not attack the
established church if they were granted emancipation. 28
The Conservatives, in the person of Mr. Pell Dawson, even
accused the Catholics of forging signatures on petitions
against the established church, which, Dawson claimed,
"were known to be in many instances in the same
handwriting."

29

Finally, the Conservatives doubted that
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the Irish were all that dissatisfied.

30

The Conservatives

argued that those Irish who were dissatisfied, the Fenians,
were not concerned with the issue of the church
establishment.

Mr. Whiteside made the disingenuous argument

that the Fenians did not attack the established church
because the Fenians knew that the church "dealt fairly and
equitably with her tenants."

31

Gray's Second Motion - 1867
The debate of 1867 was the fourth time that the Church
of Ireland had been under attack in Parliament.

The

Conservatives, like the radicals and Liberals, were starting
to sound like well-worn records.

They claimed that the

Church of Ireland was the true church, that an attack on the
Church of Ireland was an attack on private property, and
that the question was much too complicated an issue for
Parliament to address.

They even doubted that there was an

ascendancy in Ireland.

Sir Frederick Heygate stated that

"as far as [I] can tell there [is] no ascendancy in

\

Ireland."

32

The Conservatives denied that any problem

existed--they came very close to denying that there was
an established church in Ireland.
By 1867 the Conservatives could no longer claim,
however, that there was no discontent in Ireland.

They

belittled the idea that the Church of Ireland was a
legitimate and serious grievance.

Mr. Chatterton, the

Attorney General for Ireland, claimed that it was only a
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grievance (and a "sentimental" one at that) of the Catholic
clergy and certain other agitators "who sought to make for
themselves political capital." 33

Sir Frederick Heygate was

more precise in his assessment of the problem of discontent:
It (is] a mistake to imagine that the disturbances
which had recently occurred in Ireland [have] for
their origin religious grievances.
It [has] been
over and over again stated authoritatively that the
Fenian movement has no connection with Religion,
and • • • the Fenians themselves, as ~ body, [are]
4
dead to all religious considerations.
The Conservatives felt that the fact that Ireland was
discontented was all the more reason to hold onto the
established church:

"It should not be forgotten that in

all the disloyalty that [has] prevailed during the last two
years not one member of the Church of Ireland [has] been
suspected

"35

The Conservatives did not believe that

disestablishment could placate Irish discontent in the form
of Fenianism.

In fact, the Conservatives were loathe to

destroy an establishment whose members were demonstrably
loyal to the status quo in Ireland.
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CHAPTER III
"THE TIME IS NOT RIGHT":
GLADSTONE'S REACTION TO EARLY DISESTABLISHMENT MOTIONS
IN PARLIAMENT
Gladstone introduced his motions to disestablish the
Church of Ireland in 1868.

Gladstone had had ample

opportunity since 1863 to act on the disestablishment issue.
At any point during that time he could have declared himself
in favor of action; he could have pushed disestablishment to
the forefront of parliamentary consideration in much the
same way he had forced the Palmerston government to adopt a
new parliamentary reform measure.

The fact is, he did not

do so.
Of all the leading Liberals he was considered the one
most likely to adopt disestablishment as an issue.

In 1864

he was reported to have had a conversation in which he
called the Church of Ireland a "hideous blot" and he felt
that it was one of two issues on which reform was possible. 1
In 1865, Sir C. Wood told Lord Stanley that no support for
Dillwyn's motion was planned, but that "he would be sorry to
answer for what Gladstone might or might not say on any
question (laughing)."

2

Precisely what Gladstone would or

would not do was a complete unknown--Gladstone was a mystery
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to many of those around him.

3

Disraeli and Lord Stanley

were not quite sure in 1866 what Gladstone was going to do
on the question of Ireland, although they felt some action
was imminent:
He (Disraeli) hears that Gladstone has a 'sensation
measure' ready, of what kind he does not know, but
believes it to relate to Ireland: whether payment
of priests, or reduction of Irish Church endowments,
or some gr~at project of buying up the Irish
railroads.
Long before Gladstone had made up his mind to promote action
on disestablishment, those around him, especially
Conservatives, felt that he was planning some sort of
action.
Despite expectations that he would do so sooner,
Gladstone did not declare himself in favor of active reform
for Ireland, including the question of the Church of Ireland,
until late 1867.

5

Before we get to Gladstone's decision to

act on the question of the Irish church, we must understand
why in the preceding years he did not act upon his
convictions.
Dillwyn's First Motion - 1863
Dillwyn's motion in 1863 was Gladstone's first
parliamentary opportunity to declare his opinion on the
condition of the Irish church.
question should be dropped.
"the business of the

6

se~sion

He felt that the whole
Gladstone further claimed that

was • • • pressing," and that

he did not "think there was such a general desire on the
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part of the House to proceed with the debate that the
Government should give up the time at their disposal for
that purpose."

7

John Maguire, evidently misunderstanding Gladstone's
statement, felt that Gladstone was mistaken and that there
was a very great desire on the part of Ireland for a
solution to the problem.

8

Gladstone responded that he "did

not presume to say whether or not there was a strong
feeling in Ireland on the question, but only that there
had been no general manifestation of a desire in the House
for a debate on it. 119
The proponents of the measure may have been
disappointed, but, given the history of the issue, they
could not have been too surprised.

Gladstone's response

was well in step with good solid Liberal/Whig thinking.
did not say that the measure was, in itself, wrong.
not question the logic behind the measure.

He

He did

He simply stated

that he felt that there was no general sentiment in the
House of Commons to deal with the issue.

He completely

ignored the question of Temporalities.
1864
Gladstone, in 1864, called the Church of Ireland a
"hideous blot", and went on to tell Enfield that he thought
an inquiry was "unnecessary and a waste of time. 010
Gladstone's remark to Enfield is much stronger in its
condemnation of the Irish church than was his statement to
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Parliament in 1863--he was prone to making strong comments.
For example, in May of 1864, Gladstone, who was making a
speech in favor of the extension of the franchise, commented
that there was no reason in the world why every man should
not be within the "pale" of the constitution. 11

This

comment was taken to mean that Gladstone was advocating
universal male suffrage.

Gladstone, however, later said

that he wasn't sure what all the commotion was about, and
that it was not "a deliberate and studied announcement." 12
In his conversation with Lord Enfield on the Church of
Ireland he was also only voicing his opinion.

Like his

speech on parliamentary reform, his comments on the
established church were neither deliberate nor studied.
As future events were to show, Gladstone was not yet ready
to undertake the disestablishment of the Irish church.
Gladstone was giving vent to his dissatisfaction with the
established church; he was not raising the cry of battle.
Dillwyn's Second Motion - 1865
Gladstone's speech on Dillwyn's second motion is
among his more famous.

John Morley, Gladstone's biographer,

declared that with that speech "Mr. Gladstone made the
first advance upon what was to be an important journey." 13
Certainly, reviewed in retrospect, it was the beginning of
Gladstone's concern with Irish reform and was a major step
toward disestablishment, even if Gladstone was as yet
unaware that he was embarking on a crusade that lasted the
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rest of his political life.
Gladstone rose to speak immediately after Gathorne
Hardy 14 and stated that he found himself in agreement with
Dillwyn's sentiments:

"For my part I confess that I cannot

refuse to admit the truth of the first, and perhaps the most
important of these propositions that 'the present position
of the Irish Church Establishment is unsatisfactory. 11115
He reiterated arguments made by the proponents of the
measure.
Gladstone, however, felt that he could not support
the measure.

He had divided the question into two parts:

1) that the then current arrangements were unsatisfactory,
and 2) that they required the immediate attention of the
government.

The first proposition he agreed with; the

second he did not.

He felt that the question was "not so

much a question for the present as for future
consideration. 1116
Gladstone believed that Parliament "ought to decline
to follow him [Dillwyn] into the lobby, and declare that it
is the duty of the Government to give their early attention
"17

to the subject

Gladstone felt that the time was

not ripe, for a variety of reasons, to disestablish the
Irish church.

To begin with, the "country" (and he most

likely meant England) was not ready to address the question
of disestablishment.

Parliament, elected in 1859, had not

been returned on the issue of disestablishment, and

/
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Gladstone felt that before Parliament could undertake such
an arduous task the electorate should be consulted.

18

Another problem was that disestablishment and the issue of
the endowments were extremely complicated.

The question of

what to do with the endowments was very complex and needed a
great deal of study.

19

Finally, Gladstone felt that the

members of Parliament should not support Dillwyn's motion,
• • • because if we gave a vote to that effect, we
should be committing one of the gravest offences of
which a Government could be guilty--namely, giving a
deliberate, a solemn, promise to the country, wh~5h
promise it would be out of our power to fulfill.
Gladstone admitted that the condition of the Irish
church was unsatisfactory.

He was not, however, willing to

commit himself to taking any action against it.

Gladstone

had condemned the Church in very harsh words in both his
conversation with Lord Enfield in 1864 and in his speech
before Parliament in 1865.
being so condemnatory.

Gladstone really could not help

As R. Shannon has pointed out,

"Gladstone was not comfortable unless he could base his
proposed action upon the foundation of some simple, large,
grand first principle

"21

His intentions, however,

were moderate despite the effect his words had on those
around him.

22

Gladstone's speeches were often as incautious

as his actions were cautious.
Gray's Motions, 1866 and 1867
Gray's motion in 1866 came at a bad time.

Gladstone

and the Liberals were extremely busy with the pending
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electoral reform legislation and probably did not have
enough time to devote to the issue of the Irish church.

The

constraints on Gladstone's time, however, did not prevent
him from dealing with the issue of Irish discontent.

Early

in 1866, Gladstone made a speech in favor of the suspension
of habeas corpus in Ireland.

23

He also did some reading on

the question of Irish discontent.

24

He did not, however,
The nature of his

study the issue of the Irish church.

reading showed a growing awareness of the Irish inquietude.
The Russell government (Palmerston had died in 1865)
fell on the issue of electoral reform.

The issue of reform

did not, however, die with the Liberal government.

After

the failure of the Reform Bill, the English countryside
erupted into a flurry of angry "monster" meetings held to
demand electoral reform from Parliament.

The Conservative

government of Derby found itself with a potential crisis on
its hands.

The Liberals, now sitting in opposition, were

waiting for a chance to drive the Conservatives from power.
Many Englishmen were aroused and demanded that they be
given the vote.

If not for the actions of Disraeli, the

Conservatives might not have lasted more than a few months.
Disraeli realized that electoral reform was inevitable and
he saw no reason why the Conservatives should not get the
credit for extending the franchise.

The violence in England

had not been serious, but it was sufficient to convince the
Conservatives that some sort of electoral reform was
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necessary.
The question of reform was debated into the early part
of 1867.

Disraeli's initial bill was extremely

conservative, and the Liberals set out to amend it into a
bill more to their liking.

Much to the Liberals' frustra-

tion, Disraeli went along with all their amendments.
Consequently, the 1867 Reform of Parliament Act was much
more liberal than the Liberals' first bill in 1866.

Over

the years, steady pressure on Parliament had netted the
proponents of electoral reform a carefully considered and
rather conservative bill.

Widespread discontent after the

failure of the bill created a bill that neither party had
imagined possible in 1865.

The Conservatives had been

shocked into realizing that electoral reform was a necessity
by the intensity of discontent in 1866.

Would widespread

discontent have to infect Ireland before either party would
take up the issue of disestablishment?
By April of 1867 most of the substantive issues
dealing with electoral reform had been dealt with, which
left the rest of that year to consider other questions.

The

proponents of church disestablishment used the relative lull
in parliamentary business to bring forth yet another motion
to address the problem of the Church of Ireland.

Gladstone

did, on this occasion, feel inclined to speak on the issue.
He spoke in favor of Gray's motion, but was not, as he told
the House, entirely happy in doing so.

Gladstone told Gray
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that he felt difficulty in supporting the measure, not
because he questioned the "soundness of the main
proposition," but because, in a refrain that was becoming
all too familiar, he questioned "whether the time had come
when a practical plan upon this subject can with advantage
be submitted to Parliament. 1125

Gladstone was worried about

the complicated nature of the issue and was not sure that it
had been considered long enough to be effectively dealt with
by Parliament.
Gladstone was happy, however, that Gray's motion
called for the formation of a committee.

Gladstone had

opposed the earlier measures because they had called for a
consideration by the whole House to deal with the problem
of the Church of Ireland.

Gladstone had felt that the

House as a whole could not even tentatively deal with such
an important issue.

For that reason, Gladstone had spoken

against Dillwyn's motions (in 1863 and 1865) even though he
had expressed sympathy with the sentiments that lay behind
the measures.

Gray's motion in 1867 called for the

formation of a committee.

Gladstone felt that the issue

of what to do about the Irish church could be discussed
calmly within a committee, whereas if the whole House took
up the issue, great "mischief might be done by a premature
attempt at legislation. 1126

He then turned his attention to

the arguments of the Conservatives.

,,

/
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Gladstone started his attack on the Conservatives by
claiming that the Catholics could not be held captive to the
views of the long dead Lord Plunkett.

Gladstone argued that

the Catholics had respected the existence of the Irish
church and had done so with "great patience."

27

He further

added that, even if Catholics were prevented from attacking
the Irish church because Lord Plunkett had accepted the
Church of Ireland as a necessary part of the Union,
Gladstone, as an Anglican, was under no restrictions in that
sense.

Gladstone added that, if the roles were reversed and

the Catholic church was established in Protestant England
or Scotland, Parliament and the English would be working
with all their might to change that situationj and,
Gladstone added, they would be right in so doing.

28

Gladstone also attacked various other notions advanced
during the debate in defense of the Church of Ireland.

He

was skeptical of the idea that the Irish church was
necessary because it administered to the majority of the
"highly educated" citizens of Ireland.

Gladstone commented

that, if those "gentlemen" were so highly skilled and
educated, they should be able to "subsist on their own means
and not on means supplied by the public from sources which
are not legitimate."

29

Gladstone further felt that the

Conservatives were wrong in their belief that the voluntary
system would not work for the Church of Ireland in the
countryside (the Conservatives did admit that the voluntary
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system would probably work in the towns).

He pointed out

that the voluntary system had worked quite well for the
Roman Catholic Church, and, he added, he assumed that it
would work just as well for the members of the Church of
Ireland.

30

Gladstone was particularly amused by Heygate's

argument that, if the Irish church was disestablished, the
Protestants in Ireland would increase their proselytism
among the Catholics.

Gladstone took Heygate's argument

and turned it against the Conservatives.

He argued that

if Heygate was correct the Conservatives had no choice but
to vote for the measure.

Gladstone followed Heygate's

argument to its logical conclusion:

if the Church

represented truth, and if the removal of the Church of
Ireland created a feeling of missionary fervor in the
Protestants, the result of which was the conversion of
more Catholics to the Protestant faith, then the best thing
for the Protestant religion would be the removal of the
Church of Ireland.

31

He was most puzzled with the

Conservatives' contention that the disestablishment of the
Church of Ireland would be the cause of even greater civil
strife.

Gladstone found strange the threat of greater civil

disobedience:
That threat is very often used in these discussions,
but what is the meaning of it? It seems to me to
mean this. There are present a large body in
Ireland who have not obtained equality, and,
because they have not, there is an absence or a
partial absence of religious peace; but there is
another party in Ireland who have more than
equality--who have got advantages and
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priviledges--and if they are put on an equality
they will protest against it and make more
disturbance beca~~e they have equal treatment with
their neighbors.
Gladstone doubted that such a party existed in Ireland.
Gladstone was in agreement with Gray and the
proponents of the motion on the issue of the establishment
as a source of civil discontent.

Gladstone claimed that he

was in agreement with Gray when Gray claimed that the "state
was finding fuel for the Protestant Churches in Ireland,"
to which Gladstone added that he was afraid that the "state
is not only finding fuel for the Establishment, but fueling
a great many other flames. 1133

Gladstone summarized his

feelings on the relative merits of disestablishment on the
civil welfare of Ireland:
If we look to Irishmen for the same allegience
{sic], if we call upon the community of Ireland to
support and sustain us in applying restrictive
measures to the disaffected • • • do not deny 4hat
reciprocity is the essence of justice itself. 3
He fully believed that disestablishment was both a reward
and inducement to the Irish to continue their union with
England.
Gladstone was not against all establishments.

He

outlined three instances in which he felt that an
establishment was correct and desirable.

The first was on

the basis of truth:
That is one ground on which
may be maintained~ but if you
Established Church in Ireland
truth, you cannot at the same

an Established Church
maintain the
on the ground of
time maintain and
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educate a priesthood who teach the pe~gle that the
truth is not be found in that Church.
The second instance in which an established church merited
support was if it ministered to a majority of the
population.

The third instance was if the church was the

church of "the mass of the poorer portion of the
population." 36

Not even the Conservatives could argue that

the bulk of the poor Irish were Protestant; the
Conservatives had, in fact, argued that the Church of
Ireland should be maintained because the bulk of the
productive and wealthy members of Irish society were
Protestants.
Gladstone closed his statements by repeating the point
that the time for reform would soon be at hand:
I think the hon. Member for Longford is correct
in his anticipation that the time is not far distant
when the Parliament of England, which at present
undoubtedly had its hands full of other most
important business and engagements, would feel it
its duty to look this question fairly and fully in
the face; and I confess that I am sanguine enough
to cherish a hope that, though not without
difficulty, a satisfactory result will be arrived
at, the consequences of which will be so happy and
pleasant for us all that we shall wonder at the
folly ~9ich has so long prevented it being brought
about.
He had come as close as he could to supporting the measure
without taking it under his wing and adopting it as his own.
Gladstone and many other influential Liberals, however,
voted for the measure, which went down to defeat by a vote
of 195 to 183. 38

74
Gladstone was moving, albeit slowly, to the conclusion
that action would have to be taken with respect to the
Church of Ireland.

He accepted all the arguments advanced

by the proponents of the measure.

The vote had been close,

and the only possible way the balance could be tipped
would be if Gladstone, Russell, or some other member within
the inner circle of the Liberal Party (such as Chicester
Fortescue) adopted the measure for the Liberals and led the
battle in Parliament.
Gladstone's willingness to speak in terms of first
principles tended to get him into trouble with his own
party.

The other leaders of the Liberal Party feared the

effect that his words would have upon the rest of
Parliament.
Gladstone.

Conversely, the Conservatives never trusted
Some felt that Gladstone was more interested

in his own personal power than he was in addressing the
reform of the Irish church.

Despite Gladstone's willingness

to talk of first principles, his motives were not that much
more different than those of his colleagues in the Liberal
Party.
Gladstone's speech in 1865 had caused consternation
for both Liberals and Conservatives alike.

Viscount

Palmerston, the Prime Minister, had heard rumors that
Gladstone intended to speak as an "individual" member.
Palmerston attempted to stop Gladstone and sent him a
message asking if it was possible for a member of the
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government to speak as an individual member:
I understand that you propose to state tomorrow
on Dillwyn's Motion about the Irish Church your
personal views upon that Matter, as an individual
but not as a Member of the Government--! do not
know what your personal views on the matter are,
but is it possible for a Member of a Government
speaking from the Treasury Bench so to sever
himself from the Body Corporate to which he
belongs, as to be able to express decided opinions,
or to abstain from acting upon those opinions when
required to act as a Member of th3 Government taking
Part in the Decision of the Body? 9
Gladstone ignored Palmerston's note and spoke anyway.
The Conservatives were ready with their analysis of
Gladstone's motives.

Mr. Whiteside, the member for the

University of Dublin, and later a Chief Justice, expounded
on two possibilities for Gladstone's partial support for
Dillwyn's motion.

His first attack on Gladstone dealt with

Gladstone's reasons for holding back complete support from
Dillwyn's motion.

Whiteside claimed that he remembered a

speech by Gladstone in which Gladstone had stated that the
time for parliamentary reform was not at hand because the
issue was not within the purview of "practical politics."
Whiteside stated that:
I am confirmed in the opinion by his speech
to-night, that his object was to lay the
foundation of another scheme, a policy of
another and not very distant day, when he might
be able to say the time had come, and a change
of feeling had been provoked out of doors that
woul~ enable him to do then what he fears to do
now. 0
Whiteside also suspected that Gladstone was buying
time until he could better control the party.

Whiteside
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felt that Gladstone's speech was a cowardly ruse:
Fundamental Acts of Legislature are not to be
got rid of in that manner anymore than the
fundamental institutions of the Empire are to
be placed in danger, not indeed by any present
Act, not by any present Motion, but by laying
the foundation and sowing the seeds of that
future policy which will be adopted when the
noble Viscount is no longer at the h~~d of the
Government to restrain or direct it.
In both cases Whiteside felt that Gladstone, in a most
cynical fashion, was waiting for the most opportune moment
to spring the issue of disestablishment on an unwary House
of Commons.
How perceptive is Whiteside's analysis of Gladstone's
motives?

His reasoning that Gladstone was waiting for

Palmerston's death or resignation is unsatisfactory.
Whiteside, in all probability, knew nothing of Palmerston's
letter to Gladstone.

Consequently Whiteside did not know

that Gladstone was more than willing to go his own way even
when asked not to.

Gladstone had, in fact, forced the issue

of parliamentary reform on an unwilling Palmerston, 42 and,
had he felt sufficiently motivated, probably could have
forced Palmerston to accept reform of the Church of Ireland
as well.
Whiteside's argument that Gladstone did not feel the
time was suitable to bring the issue forward took on a
veneer of cynicism.

According to Whiteside, Gladstone

merely wanted to misdirect the attention of the House while
he prepared the ground for an attack on the church
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establishment in Ireland.

Stripped of Whiteside's cynicism,

however, Whiteside's statement is not too far off the mark.
Three years later, in 1868, Gladstone claimed that the
"question was not within the range of the practical politics
of the day • • • "

43

There were other reasons for Gladstone's reticence.
In a letter to Robert Phillimore (February 1865), he noted
that the Irish church was not being challenged:
It exists, and is virtually almost unchallenged
as to its existence in that capacity; it may long
(I cannot quite say long may it) outlive me; I will
never be a party knowingly, to what I may call
frivolous acts of disturbances, ~~ to the premature
production of schemes of change.
Gladstone later admitted that, "Had any man said to me,
soon will it come on?'

I should have replied,

'How

'Heaven

knows, perhaps it will be five years, perhaps it will be
ten. I u45

Gladstone, in 1865, had no idea when he felt the

issue would be ripe for action.
Gladstone's reluctance to deal conclusively with
disestablishment before 1868 was due to ambivalence over the
practical political effects of the measure.

Abstract

justice was not a sufficient reason to prompt Gladstone and
the other Liberals into action.

Gladstone was loathe to

engage in any hasty action that threatened the existence
of the Church of Ireland and the domestic and political
tranquility of England.
Why did Gladstone give a speech that could be
construed to be in favor of a revision in the status of the
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Church of Ireland?

Why did he make a favorable statement

and then turn around and say that the time for action was
not yet at hand?

It seems likely that Gladstone was

attempting to put the Liberal Party on notice that, at some
point in the future, events might deem it necessary to take
up the issue of the Irish church.

In a sense Gladstone was

attempting to help define the future course of the Liberal
Party.

In his conversation with the Duke of Enfield,

Gladstone had told Enfield that he thought "it would not
do to go to a dissolution without some proof that they were
really the Liberal party. 1146

Enfield was even more

confounded when Gladstone had expressed his personal wish
that the "present cabinet should fall, on the ground that
it had grown indolent and feeble, and wanted some years of
·
·
opposi"t"ion t o give
it
new l"f
i e. 1147

Gladstone's speech in favor of the intent of Dillwyn's
motion had immediate consequences:
Oxford.

he lost his seat at

The seat was most likely lost because, for the

first time, ballots could be mailed, and Gladstone had
incurred the wrath of the clerical graduates with his speech
on the Church of Ireland.

48

Gladstone, however, then stood

for South Lancashire, and in another of his more famous
speeches claimed that he came before them "unmuzzled."
Once unmuzzled, however, he did not approach the question
of the Irish church; he attacked the question of
parliamentary reform.
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1867-1868
In 1868 Gladstone gave notice of his intent to bring
before Parliament various motions that dealt with the Irish
church. 49

Gladstone's motions in 1868 represented a

triumph for the supporters of disestablishment.
changed?

What had

In 1867 Gladstone had been willing to give support

to a measure that would create a parliamentary committee to
look into the problem of the Irish church, albeit
reluctantly. 50

Gladstone's speech in 1867 had reflected his

caution and concern that precipitate change was to be as
feared as injustice.

Yet in 1868 Gladstone was ready and

willing to disestablish the Church of Ireland.
In order to understand why Gladstone changed his mind,
and why he decided to rally the Liberal Party around the
issue of church disestablishment, we must turn our attention
to the condition of Ireland in the 1860s.

We must see how

British perceptions of Irish discontent changed.

The step

from a committee to full-blown legislation on the Irish
church was more significant than it first appears.

The

establishment of a committee was how the British, and
Gladstone, preferred to address important and complicated
issues.

In the calm deliberation of the committee some sort

of compromise could be worked out, and minimal damage done
to the British constitution.

Gladstone's call for

legislation in 1868 was an attempt to head off a problem
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that had, in the perception of the English, become much more
serious.

Finally, we must understand the effect the Fenians

had upon the British imagination, and their role in
convincing the English that something had to be done.

81
Notes
1 Conversation between Lord Enfield and Lord Stanley,

24 July 1864, Stanley 222.
2 Sir

c.

Wood to Lord Stanley, 16 March 1865, Stanley

229.
3 See Stanley, 12 May 1864, 216.

See also 217, 228-

229, 232, 252, 269 and 346.
4 Disraeli to Stanley, 30 Jan. 1866, Stanley 245.

5 John Bright, The Diaries of John Bright, ed.
R. A. J. Walling (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1931),
30 Nov. 1867, 313.
6 In response to The O'Donoghue's request for an
adjournment of the debate.
7
8
9

Hansards CLXX (1863): 2076.

Hansards CLXX (1863): 2076.
Hansards CLXX (1863): 2076-2077.
Hansards CLXX (1863): 2077.

lO Enfield to Stanley, 24 July 1864, Stanley 222.

11 R. Shannon, Gladstone (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1984) 508.
12
13
14
15
16
17
18

Shannon 508-509.
Morley 141.
See pages 53-54.
Hansards CLXXVIII

(1865): 431.

Hansards CLXXVIII

(1865): 392.

Hansards CLXXVIII

(1865): 434.

Hansards CLXXVIII (1865): 431.

82
19 Hansards CLXXVIII (1865): 433.
20 Hansards CLXXVIII (1865): 434.
21 Shannon 510.
22 Shannon 510:

"Accordingly he proceeds to cut down

his great first principle by limitation after limitation
until, for all practical purpose, the merest shred of it is
left behind."
23 See pages 117-120.
24 See Gladstone, Diaries, vol. 6, Jan. 31-Dec. 31,
1866, pages 409-489.

Some of the material he read included

A Glance at the Irish Question, "The Evils of Ireland
Considered," and A Contribution to an Inquiry into the
State of Ireland.
25

Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 121.

26 Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 123.
27
28
29
3

o

31
32
33
34
35
36
37

Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 122.
Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 123.
Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 123.
Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 126.
Hansards CLXXXVII

(1867): 127.

Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 126.
Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 128.
Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 130.
Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 129.
Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 129.
Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 130-131.

83
38 Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 182.
39 P. Guedella, ed., Gladstone and Palmerston (New
York: Harper and Brothers, 1928) 326-327.
40 Hansards CLXXVIII (1865): 483.
41 Hansards CLXXVIII (1865): 483.
42 Magnus 160-161.
43 William Gladstone, "A Chapter of Autobiography,"
in Gleanings of Past Years (London: John Murray, 1879)
vol. 7, 97-151.

In this pamphlet he explained why he had

not acted upon Dillwyn's motion in 1865, and he attempted
to show the development of his thought since the
publication of his book, The Church in Its Relations With
the State.
44

Morley 141-142.

This was written just a month

before his speech before Parliament on Dillwyn's motion.
45
46
47
48
49

Gladstone, "Chapter" 134.
Enfield to Stanley, 21 July 1864, Stanley 222.
Stanley, 21 July 1864, 222.
Magnus 171.
Hansards CXC (1868): 1974.

SO See Hansards CLXXXVII (1867): 121.

...

CHAPTER IV
THE FENIANS
The problems that plagued the relationship between
Ireland and England go far beyond anything the Fenians did.
The majority of the Irish had long felt some sort of
antipathy toward the English.

The English had responded to

expressions of Irish discontent, when it flared up, with a
mixture of legislation, repression, and a nagging sensation
that, underneath it all, they really did not understand
what the Irish wanted.

Reform, it seemed, always followed

upon the heels of evident discontent--such as Catholic
emancipation and repeal of the Corn Laws.

Even O'Connell,

who preferred constitutional action over violence, had found
it necessary to use the threat of violence to carry his
Irish reforms through Parliament.

Ever since O'Connell's

death in 1847, Ireland had been relatively quiet.

With the

formation of the Irish Revolutionary (or Republican)
Brotherhood (IRB) and the Fenians in 1858/59, and the
subsequent formation of the National Association in 1864,
the Irish were again agitating for change in Ireland.
The IRB was founded in Dublin on March 17, 1858, by
James Stephens.

The Fenian Brotherhood was formed in the

United States in April of 1859 by James Mahoney. 1

The
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English considered both groups to be one and the same, and
at times it was hard to tell the difference between the two.
The stated goal of the IRB was the overthrow of the English
government in Ireland and the establishment of an Irish
republic.

The American organization was originally founded

to provide money and other support to the Irish Fenians.

2

The American Civil War interrupted the activities of the
American organization and for the first few years both
organizations were relatively quiescent.
In 1863, the Fenians established a newspaper, The
Irish People. 3

The paper was founded by Thomas Clarke Luby

(proprietor), Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa (manager and
publisher), and John O'Mahony (editor).

The paper was

rather strident in its tone and was closed down by the
government in 1865.

The Fenians planned an uprising for

1865 when it became apparent that the American Civil War was
about to end.

The Fenians hoped that, once Irish-American

soldiers were freed from their duties in the United States,
they would be able to provide experienced leadership and
money for the rebellion.

The leader of the Fenians, James

Stephens, was arrested and the rebellion failed to
materialize.
The failure of revolt in 1865 caused a break in the
Fenian movement.

The Americans split from the Irish

organization and removed James Stephens as their "head
centre."

The Irish movement itself split into two competing
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groups, and the Fenians remained disorganized for the rest
of the 1860s.

The suspension of habeas corpus in Ireland in

1866 drove the Fenians either underground or out of the
country altogether.

Some of those who left transferred

their activities to England where some of the larger cities
had significant Irish populations.

Although there were some

abortive risings in Ireland in 1866, none of them did much
more than illustrate the efficiency of the governmental
forces in Ireland.
Eighteen sixty-seven, however, was to be in some ways
a banner year for the Fenians.

Although they failed in

their attempt to gain access to the arms at Chester Castle,
and their attempt to liberate two prisoners

f~om

Clerkenwell

prison ended with the death of 12 innocent people--without
freeing the two prisoners--the Fenian movement managed to
capture the British imagination as it never had before.

The

execution of three Fenians convicted in a killing at
Manchester elicited a sympathetic response in Ireland; the
death of 12 persons in the rescue attempt at Clerkenwell
enraged English opinion.
The attempts by the English to suppress the Fenian
movement did not entirely succeed.

Only when the failure

of suppression became manifest to the English did they
seriously start to consider addressing Irish grievances.
The Fenians had focused British attention on the plight of
the Irish, but the three major grievances of the more vocal
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Irish--tenant rights, disestablishment and education--were
of little concern to the Fenians.

Only when the Fenians

threatened to acquire popular support in Ireland were the
English willing to consider Irish grievances.
The Catholic Church and the Fenians
Officially the Catholic church condemned the Fenians.
Archbishop Paul Cullen

4

attacked the Fenians in an 1865

pastoral:
As to what is called Fenianism, you are aware that
looking on it a compound of folly and wickedness
wearing the mask of patriotism to make dupes of the
unwary, and as the work of a few fanatics or knaves,
wicked enough to jeopardise others in order to
promote their own sordid views, I have repeatedly
raised my voice against it since it first became
known at the time of M'Manus's [sic] funeral four
years ago and that I cautioned young men against
promising or swearing obedience to strangers with
whom they were altogether unacquainted, putting
themselves at the mercy of plotting spies and
treacherous informers and risking their lives and
liberty and endangering the lives of others in
attempting to carry out projects, hopeless in
themselves, which doing no good to any class, might
involve the country in ruin and bloodshed. Would
to God that more attention had been paid to such
friendly admonitions.
If they had been listened to
we would not now have to regret that so many young
men are suffering the hardships of prison and their
families overwhelmed with affliction, whilst their
seducers are far away from danger, laughing at the
simplicity
their dupes and enjoying the wages
of iniquity.

05

Cullen found fault with the Fenians on several points. 6
For one, they were revolutionary in their ideas.

Cullen

claimed that the Fenians "preach up socialism, to seize
on the property of those who have any." 7

Cullen considered
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the Fenians as the natural result of the movements in
liberalism and rationalism.

8

Many of the parish priests, however, were caught in a
real dilemma.

The problem was, as Bishop Keane pointed out,

that the priests were losing ground with their parishioners:
The great question of the day is that of
'Fenianism.'
It is destined to exercise an
extraordinary influence on the future relations
between priests and people • • • For some years
past, several complaints were made by the people
against what they called the inactivity and neglect
of the priests.
In plain words, it was said over
and over again, 'that the priests don't care about
us any longer. They and the upper class Catholics
who expect places are well enough off, and they no
longer feel for the suffering of farmers and
working people.'
This language and sentiment
have prepared many to adopt • • • conspiraEy
against a government that refused redress.
Keane further added, "if once the masses throw off the
respect they have always felt for their priests, then will
come the real Irish difficulty for England and for all
concerned."

9

There was a fear among the bishops and

archbishops that the Irish were turning away from their
priests, and turning to other organizations that promised,
if not a solution to their outstanding grievances with
England, at least a +ight against English presence in
Ireland.

In fact, priests who were either too condemnatory

toward the Fenians, or who had been educated at Maynooth,
the state-controlled school, were sometimes ignored and
shunned:
When the priests condemned Fenianism in the
confessional and refused the Sacraments to persons
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connected with it, many Fenian youths of Cork gave
up going to Confession to priests who had been
educated at Maynooth, but some of them confessed
to priests brought up in foreign seminaries • • •
Maynooth priests, being educated at the expense
of the State, are suspect 0d of being more or less
in the English interest.
Nor were all the clergy necessarily against the
Fenians.

Father Lavelle, a Catholic priest, was noted for

preaching that Catholics had a right to revolution. 11
Father Lavelle's actions were essentially ignored by Bishop
McHale, who refused to take any concrete action against the
errant priest.

Cullen vented his frustrations against

McHale to Archbishop Keely:
I hope Dr. McHale will after the last letter take
some steps against Lavelle.
It is too bad to
oblige the Holy See to occupy itself so often
with that unhappy priest. One word from Dr. McHale
two years ago ordering Lavelle to stay in his
parish, and not act as vice-president of the
St. Patrick's Brotherhood, would have savI~
himself and that priest from great evils.
Cullen, McHale and Lavelle all represented the three basic
stances that the Irish Catholic clergy could take toward
the Fenians:

hostility, indifference, and support.

The Catholic hierarchy was technically against all
secret societies that in some way advocated abandonment
of the traditional political and social values in favor of
the more neutral liberal state.

In this sense, the

Catholic church feared the Fenians and their call for a
secular Irish republic.

The problem was that as long as

the Irish remained discontented and the English dragged
their feet on reform, the Church would continue to lose
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support in favor of those persons who promised an end to
Irish suffering.

The priests who worked at an intimate

level with the Irish people felt acutely the pull of the
dual loyalties of the Church and of their flocks.

The

longer the English delayed reform, the more willing the
priests became to support those with extreme solutions to
Irish discontent.
The English and the Irish Catholic Church
The English, for their part, quite often viewed the
Irish priests as being meddlesome, especially when it came
to politics.

Cardinal Cullen, who roundly condemned the

Fenians, was seen by some Englishmen as being quarrelsome:
I wish, tho' of course in vain, that some check
could be put upon Cullen.
I told the Pope that
he was the bitter and pertinacious enemy of the
English government and he never misses an
opportunity of doing mischief • • • It is really
too bad that this viper Cullen should be permitted
to create difficulties in addition to those which
already exist • • • I shall be glad if in gentle
language you could convey to the Cardinal
(Antonelli) and Manning the utter disgust
[emphasf~ his] we feel at the conduct of Cullen
and Co.
The English found it necessary to work with the·
Catholics in Ireland.

One of the easiest ways for the

English to do that was to attempt to get the Vatican to
apply pressure on the Irish Catholics.

Lord Stanley wrote

in his journal in 1852 that his father wishes "to lay
before the Court of Rome the conduct of the Irish
priesthood:

and to obtain a condemnation of their
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proceedings from the highest spiritual authority. 1114

The

English government used the same method in the 1860s to try
to keep Catholic priests from supporting the Fenians.

In a

series of conversations with Cardinal Antonelli, Odo Russell
(the British representative in Rome) expressed his regret
that the "Roman Catholic Clergy in Ireland had not during
the last 20 years opposed secret societies and revolutionary
organizations of part of their flock, which culminated in
.
.
,.15
F en1an1sm.

A month later Russell returned to tell

Antonelli that he had "received reliable information
according to which the priests in many places in Ireland
had joined the Fenian movement."

16

Antonelli, much to his

own regret, was forced several days later to ask Odo Russell
to see him:
His holiness had confirmed my [Russell's]
statements by private letters which had just
reached him from Ireland. The evil, however, was
happily limited to one or two cases only of
disobedience and the Pope had already caused the
erring pries17 to be reminded of their
duties • • •
The English did not entirely trust the Catholic
priests; yet they were forced to work through them to try
and stem the tide of Fenianism.

Despite being, officially

at least, on the same side of the question with reference to
the Fenians, each mistrusted the other.

The Vatican

considered "fenianism [sic] a punishment from heaven for the
revolutionary policy of Great Britain on the Continent. 1118
As long as Irish discontent remained unaddressed, the
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Catholic Church in Ireland remained a tenuous ally at best.
The English and the Fenians
Although the Fenians had been formed in 1858, their
first real noticeable appearance in Ireland was at the 1861
funeral of the Young Irelander, Terence Bellow MacManus.
MacManus, who had died in the United States, was exhumed and
brought back to Ireland for burial in December, 1861.
Although the Fenians played a relatively minor role in the
funeral itself, it was at this time that they finally came
to the notice of the Irish by their boisterour dernonstrations claiming MacManus as one of their own.

19

However, the

Fenians did not come to the notice of the English government
until the next year (1862).

Sir George Grey, the Horne

Secretary, admitted on the floor of the Commons that they
(the government) had not known of the existence of the
Fenians until 1862, at which time they were "few and
inconsiderable. 1120

The Fenians did not remain insignificant

for long.
By 1863 the Fenians showed signs of increased activity.
It was in that year they founded their newspaper, The Irish
People.

The paper proved to be of immense significance

because it was "largely responsible for transforming
Stephens' movement into a major phenomenon in Irish public
life in the mid 1860's." 21

Publication of the newspaper

helped to spread the Fenian movement throughout Ireland.

22
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In 1863 the English also became aware of the potential
threat of Fenianism in the United States.

In October of

1863 the New York Mercury published an article--reprinted by
newspapers in Ireland and Britain--that created the
impression of a "very powerful Irish-American enterprise
geared to winning Irish independence and ready to roll." 23
In November 1863, the Fenians held their first convention in
Chicago, which again was widely publicized in the papers in
Ireland and Britain.

By early 1864, the authorities in

Ireland were on the lookout for Fenians. 24
The threatened invasion of Ireland by American Fenians
did not materialize in 1864.

The Americans were involved in

the Civil War, and a great number of American Fenians were
involved in the fighting on both sides.

The Fenians in

Ireland, while waiting for the help promised them from
America, kept busy promoting their cause.

Both Stephens

and O'Donovan Rossa toured Ireland and Great Britain
drumming up support for their organization.
Eighteen sixty-four also saw the emergence of two
organizations that competed with the Fenians for dominance
over the future direction of Irish politics:
National League and the National Association.
League was founded on January 21, 1864.

the Irish
The National

The goal of the

League was "the restoration of a separate and independent
legislature," and included in its membership The O'Donoghue,
the M.P. for Tipperary (and later in 1865 the M.P. for
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Tralee), and A. M. Sullivan, the editor of the Nation.

25

The National Association was formed in late 1864 to provide
a "constitutional" organization that was to present to
Parliament solutions to the three most pressing Irish
grievances:

church disestablishment, land tenure, and

education (in the form of state-supported denominational
schools).

As E. R. Norman has stated, "the National

Association of Ireland was one of the more happy results
of Fenian organization, for it was established to provide
an alternative, safe and constitutional means of securing
the redress of Irish grievances."

26

The Fenians, the

National League and the National Association all competed
with each other for leadership in Irish politics.

The

struggle for dominance in 1864 was largely won by the
Fenians:
Throughout most of 1864 and all of 1865, normal
political activity (in Ireland) was paralysed
by Fenianism as by a spectre. The belief that
they had in their midst a secret revolutionary
army of unknown strength (with powerful allies
across the Atlantic) about to throw the country
into indescribable turmoil left most of the
inhabitan27 of Ireland without any stomach for
politics.
The Fenians, the United States and the English, 1865-66
All along the English government had worried about the
close connection between the United States and the Fenians.
The Government's suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in 1866
was in large part motivated by their fear of the Americans. 28
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The government was afraid that once the Union Army in the
United States was disbanded, large numbers of Irish-American
Fenians would return to Ireland to fight against British
rule.

In April of 1865 Mr. Whiteside asked, on the floor of

the House, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Laylard,
whether the Foreign Office has received despatches
or any information relative to statements lately
published in this country to the effect that
encouragement has been given by eminent political
individuals in the United States to a confederacy
of Fenians designed to attack Canada, to invade
Ireland, ~nd to make war, when required, upon
England? 2
Mr. Whiteside, in particular was referring to an earlier
article from the Times which he read aloud to Parliament.
The article claimed that,
On the 6th of March, 1864, a report of a meeting
of the Executive Committee of the Fenians at Chicago
appeared in the Sunday Mercury, which circulates
largely among the Irish in this city, which stated
that 'the Committee had received letters of
encouragement from hundreds of prominent men in
the country, including the Postmaster General,
Mr. Montgomery Blair, Secretary Seward, Governor
Yates (of Illinois), Mr. Speaker Colfax (of the
House of Representatives), Colonel Mulligan, and
hundreds of off ~ ers in the army and navy of the
0
United States.'
In addition he noted that the Times had reported that the
Fenians had held a convention on December 26, 1864, in
which the Fenians claimed that "it was the duty of the
American Government to declare immediate war against
England. 1131
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Mr. Laylard responded that he had been in
correspondence with the government of the United States and
that there were "only two facts mentioned which required
official notice on the part of Her Majesty's Government."
First, that Colonel J. H. Gleason had been given leave from
the Army of the Potomac for the purpose of attending a
meeting (that was unspecified), and, second, that the
Attorney General of Louisiana had been present at a meeting
of Fenians.

The American government had responded that

Colonel Gleason had been due a leave, and that there was no
law against his attending a meeting of the Fenians.
Mr. Laylard further reported that "Mr. Steward

stated

that the Attorney General of Louisiana was not responsible
for his acts to the Government of the United States, but
only to the particular State of which he was Attorney
General. 1132
The suspension of habeas corpus in 1866 created a
whole new set of problems for the governments of Great
Britain and the United States.

Even before the suspension

of habeas corpus, there was the potential for trouble
because Irish-Americans were being arrested by the Irish
authorities.

On November 11, 1865, Captain Fanning, who

had been an officer in the Tenth Ohio Volunteer Infantry,
wrote a letter to Secretary of State Seward complaining
that he had been unjustly arrested.

His letter serves as

a model for much of the correspondence on the issue of
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Americans arrested in Ireland.

After being released from

his duties in the American army, he travelled to visit
friends in Ireland.
September.

He reached Dublin on the 16th of

On the 2nd of October he left Dublin to visit

relatives at Ballinamore, in County Leitrim:
I reached the town of Killeshundra on the third
of October and while waiting to change horses, was
arrested by Sub-Inspector Valentine of the
constabular or rural police, my baggage searched,
my pistol, one round of ammunition for the same,
with a few caps, taken from me, and myself and
Lieutenant McNeff, of the same regiment,
handcuffed and thrown into jail at Cavan,
regardless of our solemn protest against such
an offense being offered to an American citizen
journeying through this place.
I was incarcerated
for seventeen days without trial at the instance
of the police • • •
When I threw off my allegiance to Victoria, the
Queen of England, and put myself under the aegis
of the United States, I felt such a thrill of
exultation on changing the degrading status of
a mere subject to the proud one of citizenship,
as c~~ld not have been known to even the Roman of
old.
The case of Captain Fanning illustrates the problems
faced by Great Britain in attempting to stifle the Fenian
movement.

The English found it necessary to be extremely

wary of strangers roaming the Irish countryside.

That many

of those strangers were Americans caused additional problems.
The arrests of Irish-Americans raised the question as to
which country had jurisdiction over the detained persons.
The English did not recognize naturalized citizens, and
felt that Irish-Americans were still British subjects.
The government of the United States, on the other hand,

98

did consider them American citizens.

The suspension of

the Habeas Corpus Act created a flood of complaints on the
part of arrested Irish-Americans.

The American consul in

Ireland, Mr. West, was kept busy sorting out the claims
of those who asked for the protection of the American
government.

34

The Fenians in America had realized that the only way
a successful rebellion could occur in Ireland was if Great
Britain was involved in a war.

Fenian activities in the

United States complicated an already serious situation.
Relations between the United States and Great Britain had
been exacerbated because of the Alabama claims.

The

suspension of habeas corpus and the internment of
Irish-Americans threatened to raise larger issues of
naturalization and citizenship.

Both countries behaved

decently and the problem, as far as the British were
concerned, had been resolved.

They were able, albeit

temporarily, to stem the tide of Fenianism in Ireland.

The

United States was happy because, within a few months after
the suspension of habeas corpus, all Americans had been
released.
Suspension of Habeas Corpus
The end of the Civil War in the United States brought
an increasing number of Irish-Americans to Ireland and,
according to Sir George Grey, the danger of Fenianism had
increased alarmingly in consequence.

35

Through 1865 the
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Liberal government of Palmerston insisted on dealing with
the Fenians by the usual legal means available.

On

September 19, 1865, Government forces in Ireland seized
both the leaders of the movement and closed down their
newspaper, The Irish People. 36
The use of normal legal channels was not enough and,
on February 17, 1866, Sir George informed Parliament that
it was his sad duty to introduce a bill that would suspend
the Habeas Corpus Act in Ireland.

Sir George claimed that

in "making the motion" he was doing so with a "deep sense"
that it was the government's duty to ask Parliament for the
"additional power" to:
put an effectual check on a wicked and widespread
conspiracy which now exists in Ireland, and to
afford protection to the loyal and fait~7u1
subjects of Her Majesty in the country.
Sir George went on to state that the "Fenian conspiracy has
lately assumed proportions, a form, and an organization
which could hardly have been expected a short time ago." 38
Charles Adams, the American ambassador to Great Britain,
reported to William Seward, Secretary of State, that he had
learned:
from several sources that the uneasiness and
discontent in Ireland are not thought to have
been diminished by the conviction and sentence
of the offenders who have been brought to trial.
The Fenian organization (in Ireland) is affirmed
to be spreading in every direction, carrying with
it many of the more intelligent class of the
tenantry, and even comp391ing the acquiescence
of some of the priests.
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The suspension of the Act of Habeas Corpus in Ireland
was necessary, or so the British government thought, for a
variety of reasons.

The English felt that Ireland was

rapidly becoming ungovernable.

Lord Wodehouse, the Lord

Lieutenant for Ireland, wrote to Grey, telling him that
"I have little hope of pacifying in the alarm, which is
doing most serious injury to every interest here, without
seizing the agents who are busily employed all over the
country, sowing sedition and organizing the conspiracy." 40
Grey felt that the Fenians themselves were contemptible,
but that they had the potential of gaining influence over
the people of Ireland. 41

In addition, the probable longterm

effects of Fenian influence were thought to
disastrous.

b~

equally

He felt that the outcome of an insurrection,

and he had no doubt that the English would win, would be
"bloodshed, massacre, and the other crimes which the people
usually commit in the first moment of an insurrection."

42

Finally, if the Fenians were not stopped, industry in
Ireland would be paralyzed, capital would no longer flow
into the country, and development of Ireland's resources
would be checked. 43
The proposed bill was to be in effect for six months
and was to expire on the first of September.

It would give

Dublin Castle the right to "detain such persons as he [the
Lord Lieutenant] • • • shall suspect of conspiracy against
Her Majesty's Person and Government."

44

The bill passed all
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three readings in both houses on the 17th.

Charles Adams

made note on Parliament's hast in his dispatch to Seward:
Sir: The event of the week has been the
application of ministers to Parliament for a
suspension of the habeas corpus in Ireland.
The reason given for this strong measure is
the spread of the Fenian organization, in spite
of all the efforts made to check it by ordinary
means. The explanations were made simultaneously
in both houses on Saturday, an unusual day for
transactions of other than mere formal business,
and necessary measures were passed with a rapidity
believ~g to be unexampled even in the worst preceding
cases.
Adams in fact suspected that the authorities in Ireland had
started rounding up suspects even before the bill had been
officially passed into law:

"There is reason to believe

that the necessary sanction was scarcely passed through its
forms, before hundreds of suspected men were swept into
"46

prison

Indeed, the authorities in Ireland had

jumped the gun, and "hours before they could have received
confirmation of a formal enactment they had moved against
scores of suspects."

47

The Fenian threat had provoked the English to act.
At first the English had been content to allow the law to
take its normal course.

The rapid spread of Fenianism,

despite the arrests of its leaders, forced the English to
suspend the Act of Habeas Corpus.

It is ironic that reform

of Irish grievances met so much resistance in Parliament,
while on the other hand the English were capable of moving
so quickly when they needed to strengthen the forces for
repression.
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1867 - Chester Castle, Manchester, and Clerkenwell
The effect of the suspension of the Act of Habeas
Corpus worked, in some ways, as well as the English could
have hoped.

Irishmen who had been associated with the

Fenian movement in Ireland, if they were not already in
jail, had either fled the country, gone underground, or
completely quit the movement.

As one historian noted,

"the suspension of habeas corpus wreaked havoc on
Fenianism in Ireland, shifting the odds in favor of the
authorities. 048

The suspension of habeas corpus was not

lifted after six months, and in four more acts the suspension
.
d • 49
was con t 1nue

The initial success of the authorities in

Ireland calmed the English people, and the Illustrated
London News could write in January of 1867, in a tone of
restrained optimism:
The general gloom which enveloped 1866 was not
relieved by the error of our domestic politics •
To the disquiet which this question excited
(parliamentary reform) must be added the
apprehensions awakened by the Fenian conspiracy.
In the earlier part of the year raids into Canada,
in the later threatened insurrection in Ireland,
exhibited at once the astounding folly, the
malignity, and the pertinacity of the discordant
materials of which that combination consists.
Its
bark, however, was worse than its bite.
In America,
the enthusiastic gallantry of the volunteers,
backed by the loyalty of the United States
President, quickly scattered the buccaneering
expedition; in Ireland, the suspension of the
Habeas Corpus Act, the judicious firmness of the
Administration, and the skillful distribution of
the military prevented the plot from maturing into
rebellion; but, both in the colony and at home,
it was a gratuitous 3Bd vexatious cause of public
anxiety and expense.
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The optimism of the Illustrated London News was to be
short-lived.

The Fenians in Ireland had been suppressed,

but there were Fenians in England who were willing to take
up the cause.
In February of 1867, the Fenians planned a raid to
capture the large depot of arms at Chester.

Once the arms

were seized, they were to be shipped over to Ireland.

In

anticipation of the raid, the Fenians began to congregate
in large numbers in the town.

Through the efforts of an

informant by the name of John Joseph Corydon, the
authorities were aware of the plans of the Fenians, and
the police armed themselves and strengthened their numbers
with volunteers and reinforcements.
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The sh6w of force

intimidated the Fenians, who dispersed into the English
countryside.

The event, as one historian has noted, "was

in a sense a non-event in that it ended in anti-climax
and undramatic failure."

52

Of much greater significance than the attempted raid
at Chester Castle was the rescue of two Fenian prisoners
at Manchester.
brethren:
Deasy.

The Fenians planned to rescue two of their

Colonel Thomas J. Kelly and Captain Timothy

In the rescue attempt on September 18th, a

policeman, Sergeant Charles Brett, was accidentally killed.
Five men were arrested for the shooting of Brett.

Of the

five, three were condemned to death and were executed on
November 23rd.

The three executed men, William Philip
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Allen, Michael Larkin and Michael O'Brien, joined the
pantheon of Irish martyrs.
The imprisonment and the execution of the "Manchester
Martyrs" stirred up a storm of controversy.

It was not as

if the Government (at this time under the Conservatives)
did not know what effect political executions would have
upon the Irish.

Lord Stanley had argued against the

execution of a Fenian prisoner back in May of 1867 because
the execution would only turn the prisoner into a martyr
and help the Fenian cause.
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From the very beginning,

however, Gathorne Hardy, the Home Secretary, was determined
to punish those responsible for the killing at Manchester.
On September 20th Hardy noted that the newspapers "have a
short account of the Manchester outrage & the Times is as
the public will be ready for strong measures. 1154

Hardy

further felt that not to punish the Fenians would be wrong
since England would "never endure that such an event should
happen unpunished •

II
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If Hardy had ever been uncertain

of what course to take, his interview with Queen Victoria
confirmed him in his desire to see the Fenians executed:
"Since lunch I have had a long interview with the Queen who
was very gracious & cheerful.
not approve of more mercy)

She spoke of Fenians--(did
II
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A storm of protest swept over both England and
Ireland.

In England John Bright led a delegation to the

Home Office to convince Hardy that execution was too severe.

105
Rebuffed in his efforts, Bright wrote in his diary two days
before the execution that the "Tories know little mercy;
terror is their only specific. 1157

On the day after the

execution, Bright noted that "the hanging of the 3 men at
Manchester has caused some excitement. 1158
In Ireland demonstrations and marches were held in
favor of the executed Fenians.

On December 1st a "large

procession" of 2,500-3,500 people was held in Manchester:
"as the procession marched past the New Bailey, where the
gallows had been erected, they gave three cheers for Allen,
Larkin and Gould. 1159

In Cork, on the 1st also, a procession

was held that was estimated to have attracted 12,000-15,000
marchers. 60

The largest procession was held in Dublin on

Sunday the 8th.

The Annual Register estimated that there

were less than 16,000 marchers, although it seems likely
that there were anywhere from 20,000 to 30,000 marchers. 61
More important than the demonstrations themselves were some
of the people who expressed a degree of sympathy for the
Fenians.

O'Neill Daunt, certainly no friend of the Fenians,

called the executions "judicial murder" and claimed that
"the murder of those three men will widen the breach between
this country and England. 1162

Cullen allowed priests to pray

for the Manchester men, and even allowed them to say private
masses for them.

63

Characteristically, he couldn't help

but take a dig at the English and wrote in a letter that
"the English have given large sums to Garibaldi to assail
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the Pope • • • now as they have done to others so it is done
to themselves. 1164

Even more ominously, at the head of the

procession in Killarney was the M.P. for Tralee, The
O'Donoghue.
A third event, one that shocked the English public,
occurred at Clerkenwell prison on Friday the 13th, 1867.
Ricard O'Sullivan Burke had been arrested by the English for
his part in the Manchester rescue.

The Fenians decided that

they would attempt to rescue Burke and another Fenian by the
name of Casey. 65

The plan was relatively simple.

The

rescuers were to roll a keg of gunpowder up against the
prison wall (Burke and Casey would be doing their regular
hour of exercise in the prison yard).

A white ball was to

be tossed over the wall to warn the two prisoners that
their rescuers were setting off the charge.

Casey and

Burke would then wait away from the area where the hole was
going to be blown and, in the confusion caused by the
explosion, they would rush through the breach in the wall
to their freedom.
unsuccessful:

The first attempt on December 12th was

the fuse refused to stay lit.

the Fenians tried again.

On the 13th

This time the fuse lit and blew

a hole in the wall "twenty feet wide at the base and sixty
feet wide at the top, killing 12 persons in the surrounding
neighborhood and wounding close to a hundred. 1166

Burke

and Casey, in their cells at the time of the blast, were not
freed.
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The effect of the Clerkenwell explosion on the English
was profound.

The English throughout the countryside became

paranoid and started to imagine that they, too, were to be
the victims of Fenian terrorism.
abounded throughout England.

Rumors of Fenian activity

Lord Stanley noted in his

journal that Hardy had,
received a multitude of Fenian communications.
One informant speaks of 155 Fenian and republican
clubs in London alone, all unknown to the police.
Several announce projects for blowing up the House
of Parlt [sic], and assassinating the Queen.
Another reported plan is to seize the P. of w.
[sic] [Prince of Wales] on his way to or from
Sandingham [sic]. From Philadelphia comes a story
of an association whose object is to hire houses in
various parts of London, fill them with combustibles,
and set them on fire at the same time. A Fenian
has been heard to threaten the burning of the
theatres when full, and the destruction of public
buildings. The police report on Fenian evidence,
that three men are told off to assassinate Ld.
D(erby) [sic], Hardy and me. Monck telegraphs
(and this is the most serious, as being in some
degree authenticated) that a ship is to sail for
Dieppe ostensibly, really for the Bristol channel,
from New York, with a p~7ty on board whose object
is to murder the Queen.
Throughout early 1868 papers such as the Illustrated London
News constantly ran articles on the visit of the Prince of
Wales to St. Bartholomew Hospital where many of the victims
were staying, or they ran articles describing the recovery
of the victims. 68

In addition, the Illustrated London News

ran articles on the activities, or supposed activities, of
the Fenians and of the fearful responses of various
communities.

They reported, for instance, the theft of 60

revolvers and 1,500 rounds of ammunition in Cork.

They
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reported that special constables were sworn in at the
Woolwich arsena1. 69

The Illustrated London News was able

to report that the "special Constable movement seems to
have pervaded the whole of the United Kingdom.

The

provincial papers, both English and Scottish, are filled
with reports of magisterial meetings to enroll defenders
of law and order."

70

The most common reaction to the Clerkenwell explosion
was horror and disgust.
American Fenians.
of the violence. 71

The incident at Clerkenwell divided

Some of them condemned the senselessness
More importantly, the Clerkenwell

explosion helped those who were chronically anti-Irish.
William Murphy was typical of the hysterical anti-Irish,
anti-Catholic sentiment that fed off of such events.
Throughout the 1860s he lectured for a group called the
Protestant Evangelical Mission and Electoral Union. 72
Murphy's speeches were vitriolic and quite often accompanied
by violence.

In one town, Wolverhampton, the violence

was so intense that the mayor asked Murphy not to hold any
more meetings.

When Murphy refused, the mayor was forced

to swear in special constables. 73

The combination of the

incident at Clerkenwell and the 1868 elections provided
Murphy with a volatile situation that he used to attack
those who advocated Irish reform.

The "no-popery" cry that

was raised, though much more limited than the defenders
of the established Irish church hoped, was in part due to
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the combination of discontent in Ireland, the incident at
Clerkenwell, and the speeches of Murphy.

74

Murphy called

the demands of the Catholics "impudent" and claimed that
they "were reaping the fruits of the Catholic Emancipation
Act."

75
The events at Manchester and Clerkenwell captured the

attention of the English as no other Fenian activities had
before.

Manchester aroused Irish sympathy for the Fenians;

Clerkenwell horrified the English.
becoming completely unmanageable.

The situation was
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CHAPTER V
GLADSTONE, THE FENIANS AND CHURCH DISESTABLISHMENT
By late 1867 it became apparent to Gladstone that
Ireland was significantly discontented, discontented enough
for him to go beyond personal expressions of support to
promote disestablishment.

After the events at Manchester

and Clerkenwell, reform of the three major Irish grievances
(land, church, and education) became necessary.

Gathorne

Hardy, the Conservative Home Secretary in 1868, noted that
the Government "was ready to consider disestablishment, but
proposed the postponement of the question until the next
parliament." 1

Gladstone himself admitted in a letter to

Earl Grey that recent problems in Ireland had convinced even
the Conservatives of the necessity of reform:
I further admit that Ld-Derby's Government must
in substance have shared this impression, when
before ~ ~ ~ party had proposed anything
[emphasis mine], they thought it their duty to
propound a policy for Ireland, including ~n it the
questions of Church, Land, and Education.
Once the Derby/Disraeli government fell in 1868,
however, the Conservatives refused to countenance any
change in the religious status quo in Ireland.

The

Conservatives were convinced that the Liberals had been
influenced by the Fenians.

The Conservatives were skeptical

about the effects Irish reform would have on Fenianism.
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The Quarterly Review, a conservative magazine, felt that:
When the suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act in
Ireland was moved, Mr. Bright considered it a fitting
opportunity to enlarge on the wrongs of Ireland,
to suggest that the remedy for Fenianism was to
be found in the alterations of the tenure of land,
and in the abolition of the Irish Church . • •
Whatever may be the merits of Land Reform or Church
destruction, they have nothing to do with Fenianism.
It will run its course whether land be placed in
new hands or left in old ones, whether cardinal or
archbishop rule in Dublin.
It is a National, not
a religious nor an agrarian movement, its hatred
is not so much ~f English institutions as of
England itself.
The Quarterly Review was half right.

There was little

direct link between the Fenians and church disestablishment
in that it was not one of their demands.

Furthermore, the

Fenians were motivated by a blind and passionate hatred of
England.

While the Quarterly Review could not find any

connection between Fenianism and church disestablishment,
Gladstone and the Liberals could.
Gladstone's speech in 1865 was made at a time when
the Fenians were just beginning to make their presence
felt.

4

The Fenians in Ireland were one of several groups

at that time that were purporting to speak for Ireland.

By

early 1865 they had successfully made their presence felt,
and were beginning to gain adherents among the Irish in
Ireland and Great Britain.

The American Fenians had also,

by early 1865, gained the attention of the English.

The

English realized that, once the American Civil War was over,
the American Fenians would attempt to act on their plans to
free Ireland from Great Britain.

Fenians were not, in 1865,
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a direct threat, and while Gladstone was willing to admit to
the justice of church disestablishment, he was skeptical of
5
the seriousness of Irish discontent.
In 1866, Gladstone, for various reasons already
discussed, declined to address Gray's first anti-church
.

mo t ion.

6

The Fenians in 1866, however, had become a greater

threat than they had been in 1865.

The spread of the Fenian

movement startled many in Parliament.

The Queen, in her

opening address to Parliament, noted that a "conspiracy"
had "appeared in Ireland" that was "adverse alike to
Authority, Property, and Religion • • • " 7

"Fortunately,"

she continued, the Fenians were "disapproved and condemned
alike • • • without Distinction of Creed or Class • • • ,"
and that "the Constitutional Power of the ordinary Tribunals
had been exerted for its Repression, and the authority of
the Law had been firmly and impartially vindicated." 8
Eleven days later the Liberal government was sufficiently
worried to pass the first of four habeas corpus suspension
acts.
Gladstone spoke in favor of suspension of the Habeas
Corpus Act.

He believed, as did many Englishmen, that the

Fenian movement was essentially American in origin.

He

noted that they were not "wanting in funds for its support,"
and that the suspension of habeas corpus was necessary
since under the regular laws, and with all their money, the
Fenians were able to quickly bail themselves out of jail.

9
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In a later debate he stated, "it may be perfectly true--and
is, unhappily, too true--that Fenianism in the main, under
the means by which it is supported, is a thing imported by
America."lO

Gladstone also noted that the measure had not

been intended at the beginning of the parliamentary session
because "the emergency was not at that time of that grave
character which alone would have justified us in taking an
extreme step in regard to it • • • "

11

Gladstone also

refused to take seriously Bright's statement that, if
Ireland could, she would "unmoor" herself and "move at
least 2,000 miles to the west."

12

Gladstone claimed that

the Irish could not be too unhappy with the suspension of
habeas corpus since none of them had declared themselves
against it.

13

Gladstone continued:

We have the unanimous consent of the House
expressed to this effect, and expressed by every
member who comes from Ireland that this conspiracy
deserves the disapproval and condemnation which
have already been bestowed upon it by everyone who
can claim to represent either the property the
14
morality, or the religion of the country."
Gladstone still believed that Irish grievances should
be attended to--in due time.

Gladstone asked Parliament

to "give anxious consideration • • • to every subject
connected with the welfare of Ireland."

"But," as Gladstone

added, "do not let these subjects which, important as they
are, are less important than the duty of today,
interfere with the discharge of that duty."

15

to
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In August of 1866 he rose to speak on a renewal of the
suspension of habeas corpus. 16

Gladstone agreed with the

Government that an extension was necessary.

He acknowledged

that the state of affairs was not yet settled enough to
warrant the removal of the suspension.

Furthermore,

Parliament was about to recess for six months, and in that
time it would be impossible to re-assemble Parliament to
pass another suspension if one were needed. 17
Gladstone also acknowledged that there was some
justification in Irish discontent.

He stated that the

Government, by renewing the suspension of habeas corpus,
"enhance and deepen their own obligation to recognize and
appreciate the true condition of Ireland." 18

Whatever

grievances there were they could not be tied to the conduct
of the Fenians.

He noted that there were "those who look

back to the history of Ireland [who] will feel that there
are extenuating circumstances for political crimes in
connection with the state of things that have existed for
a long period."

19

Those extenuating circumstances, however,

did not apply to the Fenians.

To Gladstone, if there was

a series of acts that exhibited the "virulence and malignity
of Fenianism" it was the attack on Canada. 2

°

Canada, which

had not done anything to the Irish or the Fenians, had been
the victim of a "ruthless, and murderous act

"21

Gladstone was convinced that Fenianism was a cancer-a foreign cancer.

He felt that in order to cure the

120
patient, Ireland, it was necessary to first surgically
remove the tumor.
of rehabilitation.

Then the patient could be helped by way
By the end of 1866 Gladstone was

beginning to realize that the government would have to
consider addressing Irish grievances sometime soon.

He was

not, however, ready to commit either himself or the Liberal
Party to a program of reform.

22

By early 1867 Gladstone was willing to consider some
reform of Irish grievances.

The Fenians had not disappeared.

In fact, they had attempted several abortive risings in
Kerry and around Dublin and Munster (February 12 to March 6,
1867).

The Fenians had also attempted the raid on Chester

Castle on the 14th of February.

The Fenians in every

instance had proven themselves totally incompetent.

They

had also proven themselves to be extremely durable.

Despite

the suspension of habeas corpus in Ireland, they had still
been able to attempt a few risings in Ireland.

More

ominously, some of their activities now centered on England.
Gladstone was moving, albeit slowly, toward the realization
that something had to be done for Ireland.
proceeded cautiously.

Yet he still

By the time of Gray's motion in

1867, he was willing, as an individual member, to support
the formation of a committee to look into the condition of
the Church of Ireland.

He was not willing to

party to a program of Irish reform.

comm~t

the

As late as July of

1867, Gladstone still felt that all he could give was his
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personal support.

Cardinal Cullen asked Gray to clarify

Gladstone's position on the church question.

Gladstone told

Gray that he was npersonally free to support any adjustment
approved by Ireland."

23

Gladstone, by mid-1867, was much

more willing to address the issue of Irish church reform,
yet he refused to acknowledge that it was an issue to be
considered by the Liberal Party.

Gladstone still did not

feel that immediate action needed to be taken to reform the
church on the part of the Party.

Only after extensive study

could either the Liberal Party or the country be ready to
accede to the demands of the Irish.

24

The event at Manchester proved to be of great
significance.

Not long after the incident he confided to

John Bright, who recorded it in his diary, that the time had
come to disestablish the Irish church:

"An hour and a half

with Mr. Gladstone this morning on future politics:
Ireland in particular.

On

He is willing wholly to suppress

State Church in Ireland, but with a wish it had not been
necessary."

25

In a conversation with General Grey, after

it was obvious that he [Gladstone] was to be the next Prime
Minister, he told Grey that "he had made up his mind •
that the Irish Church must be dealt with, when reading in
the railroad, the account of the Fenian prisoners at
Manchester."

26

What was it about Manchester that so galvanized
Gladstone?

What was it about the events at Manchester that
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convinced Gladstone that the time to end the established
Church of Ireland was at hand?

Gladstone had stated in his

speech in support of the first suspension of the Habeas
Corpus Act (on February 17, 1866) that,
two generations ago a well spread rebellion in
Ireland would have plunged whole provinces or
extended districts in blood.
In 1822, when
the Habeas Corpus Act was suspended, there was
a spirit of disaffection, powerful not in numbers
only, but in other elements of s27ength, and that
was not of foreign introduction.
Gladstone also claimed in this same debate that the Irish,
by their own "means and resources exclusively •

[could]

effectually and quickly extinguish all the machinations of
those disloyal and misguided men."

28

Clearly the reaction

to the events at Manchester had shown the
give sympathy to the Fenian cause.

Iri~h

ready to

The actions of Daunt,

Cullen and The O'Donoghue clearly illustrated Ireland's
discontent with Parliament's progress on the question of
Irish reform.

29

Once Gladstone had decided that the Irish church had
to be disestablished, he wasted little time in acting on
his conviction.

At Southport he gave a speech before his

constituents that outlined his views.

He asked the audience

if they would for one moment tolerate a Catholic church
imposed upon them from without.

He claimed that he wanted

Ireland to be like Scotland so that "instead of hearing
in every corner of Europe the most painful commentaries upon
the policy of England towards Ireland--we may be able to
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look our fellow Europeans of every nation in the
face

.,30

Gladstone went on to repeat the vast majority

of arguments that he had heard in Parliament in favor of
disestablishment.

31

In February 1868 Gladstone read a book by John Maguire,
entitled The Irish in America.

32

The book was written in

1867, and was based on Maguire's travels in the United
States and Canada.
Maguire's book was an attempt to determine the opinion
of Irish-Americans toward Great Britain.

He wrote in the

introduction that he was,
• • • anxious to ascertain the real nature, that is
the strength or the intensity of the sentiment which
I had reason to believe was entertained by the Irish
in the United States towards the British Government;
as I considered, and I hold rightly, that the
existence of a strong sentiment or feeling of
hostility is a far more serious cause of danger,
in case of future misunderstanding or complication
than any organ~3ation, however, apparently extensive
or formidable.
The book was also a call for Irish reform.

Maguire hoped

to promote Irish reform in Parliament in order to stop the
steady deterioration of relations between Irish Catholics
and the English.

Maguire felt that any organization, no

matter how small and disorganized, could grow as long as
it could feed off of popular discontent:
Though an organisation may be ill-designed or
even ridiculous, or, on account of the folly, or
violence, or treachery, of those who are responsible
for its management, may come to a speedy dissolution,
if it has its origin in an earnest and enduring
feeling, it is significant of danger--it represents
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more than is seen; and die down as it may~ it is
4
sure to spring up again in some new form.
Maguire was, in the main, referring to the Fenians.

Maguire

felt that the Fenians were not interested in reform--because
reform would undermine the basis of their support:
The thorough-going Fenians--whether leaders or
actors, or rank and file--would, if anything,
prefer that the admitted causes of Irish discontent
should not be removed; for they naturally argue--' If
our hopes of regenerating Ireland be based upon
revolution, it is better for our purpose that the
various causes and sources be allowed to exist, and
by their prolonged existence irritate and gall the
public more and more, and thus keep the people in
a conditio~ most favorable to revolutionary
5
teaching.'
Maguire compassionately called for reform while there was
still time.

He felt that as long as there were legitimate

grievances in Ireland, that unhappy island would always be
a problem for England--even if the Fenians disappeared:
• though Fenian leaders may quarrel or betray,
and Fenian organisations may wither or collapse there
must be perpetual danger to the peace, the honour,
if not the safety of England, from a power which it
is i~possible 50 ignore, and madness to
3
despise • • •
The Fenians were a symptom of a greater illness.
reform was not a surrender to Fenian demands.

Thus,

The Fenians

were not directly concerned with the question of the Church
of Ireland.

Church disestablishment, however, did serve

the purpose of removing a grievance.

Once that grievance

had been removed, Maguire thought that Ireland would again
be serene and comfortable in her relations with England.
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On March 16, 1868, Gladstone rose to give a speech
upon Maguire's motion for a committee to look into the state
of Ireland.

He accused the government of failing to

realize "in any degree at all approaching truth, the grave,
and I would say solmn, fact that we have reached a crisis
in the history of Ireland. 1137

Gladstone's words, although

true, seem to be too harsh on the Conservatives.

After all,

while his party was in power, he and the Liberals had done
little to address Irish discontent.

Certainly, E. R. Norman

has touched upon part of the reason.

Norman feels that

Gladstone addressed the issue of disestablishment in 1868 in
order to head off the government's intent to address the
issue of education.

Gladstone did not

believ~,

by 1868,

that the government should fund Catholic education.

The

Catholics, on the other hand, had no desire to see the
spread of secular schools.

The Conservative government

wanted to address the issue of Irish reform by giving the
Catholics part of what they wanted--denominational schools
paid for by the State.

Gladstone hoped to head off this

action by holding out a larger prize:
disestablishment.
opportunistic.

38

church

This perhaps makes Gladstone look

Gladstone, as A. Ramm has pointed out, was

more than willing to use power to further his own ambition.
Yet there is no doubt, however, that his ambition was
tempered by a strong sense of duty and morality; and
certainly he would have preferred that Ireland be reformed
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by his plans and ideas, not those of a minority government.
Yet, Norman's analysis does not completely answer why
the idea of addressing Irish grievances was so important to
both Gladstone and the Conservatives in 1868.

In his

speech, and in others, including his 1868 election pamphlet,
A Chapter of Autobiography, he constantly addressed the
problem of the Fenians.

He asked why the Irish in Canada

and Australia had not revelled at the first sign of Fenian
activity in their countries:
Neither in Canada nor in Australia does the
Irishman labour under the slightest difficulty with
regard to the legal security he enjoys for the
fruits of his industry and labour, nor is he
confronted by the spirit or the remai~bng
institutions of a hostile ascendancy.
The English, he continued, had seen the "loathsome disease
of Fenianism overflow into England. 1141

Gladstone further

indicated that he had at long last recognized the pervasive
nature of Irish discontent:
in the present state of Ireland, with its suspended
liberties and its continuing evils assuming a
subtler, but perhaps on that account, a more
formidable shape, and viewing that state of things
which has grown up in this country in no small
degree under the influences of the changes proposed
and promoted by Her Majesty's present administration,
I recognized that the time has come when this
question ought to be broached, and when it is
42
broached it ought to be dealt with once for all.
On March 20, 1868, he gave notice that he was going to
present several motions to disestablish the Irish church. 43
Gladstone came to the conclusion, after the incident at
Manchester, that the time for disestablishment had arrived.
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What was to be gained by wooing the Irish away from the
Fenians?

A consistent theme through many of his speeches

was the need to maintain the union between Ireland and
Great Britain.

In 1866, in a speech on the suspension of

the Act of Habeas Corpus, Gladstone had claimed:
We do not propose this measure because we believe
that it is through English influence and English
regiments that the connection between the two
countries to be maintained. My firm belief is
that the influence of Great Britain in every Irish
difficulty is not a domineering and tyranizing,
but a softening and mitigating influence; and that
were Ireland detached from her political connection
with this country, and left to her own unaided
agencies, it might be that the strife of parties
would there burst forth in a form ca!~ulated to
strike horror through the land • • •
He repeated this sentiment two years later when he said that
delay in addressing Irish grievances "tends to compromise
and cripple the strength of the empire." 45

In 1863 the

Irish, while to some degree discontented, had not seemed
overly so.

The events after Manchester illustrated that a

significant portion of Irish society was seriously
discontented.

They were, in fact, discontented enough to

express sympathy for an organization that they had earlier
condemned.

Gladstone realized that the continued existence

of outstanding grievances could possibly convince many
Irish that the only way to redress those grievances would
be to break the ties between Great Britain and Ireland.
Gladstone, the cautious politician that he was, needed
proof of that discontentment.

Public sympathy for the
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Fenians provided the impetus that Gladstone needed to
introduce motions for the disestablishment of the Irish
church.
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CONCLUSION
PACIFY IRELAND
Gladstone, as we have seen, was a cautious and careful
politician--to a degree.

Before 1867 he was willing to

consider disestablishment as a "future" question.

In this

sense he was not a politician motivated by a crisis.

His

preferred method of operation was to work the issue out
slowly--as he attempted to do with parliamentary reform in
1865.

Once the situation hit crisis proportions, however,

that element in him that Magnus called "volcinic" erupted. 1
The results of such a political technique had profound
effects.

To the Irish it seemed as if the only way to get

reform was through exhibitions of large scale discontent.
O'Neill Daunt noted in his journal a letter from Carvell
Williams:

"He seems to think that this Fenian affair may

accelerate the disendowment of the State Church by
compelling statesmen to take measures calculated to remove
or diminish the prevalent disaffection." 2

Nor was the

timing of disestablishment lost upon the Fenians:
When William E. Gladstone in 1869 introduced the
Bill to disestablish the Protestant Church in
Ireland, he admitted in his speech that his new
outlook on Irish affairs was due to the intensity
of Fenianism. His remarks on that occasion proved
a stronger argument in favor of physical force--and
even Terrorism--on the part of Ireland to secure
justice and freedom than any Irishman ever made. 3
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Gladstone had succeeded in disestablishing the Irish church,
yet, with advantage of hindsight, he also in a sense helped
continue the awareness on the part of the Irish that only
violence could convince the English to take note of Irish
grievances.
How can we make sense of the Fenian contribution to
Gladstone's decision to disestablish the Irish church in
1868?

E. R. Norman has stated that Gladstone was convinced

of the "urgency" to act by the Fenians.

4

In a sense he is

correct, but the influence of the Fenians went beyond a
sense of "urgency."

Gladstone's words, now famous, upon

hearing that he was to become Prime Minister were, "My
mission is to pacify Ireland."

Ireland, by late 1867, was

in a chronic state of discontent.

The fact that the Fenians

were gaining support among the Irish disturbed the English.
The fact that they were considered to be a foreign import
by the English only added to the realization that, if
grievances were allowed to fester, the Irish would cleave to
any form of rebellion--no matter where it came from nor how
ridiculous it might be.

Disestablishment, in part, was

intended to help smooth over the rising discontent in
Ireland.

Earl Spencer, who was appointed Viceroy of

Ireland in 1868, commented in a letter to Lord Clarendon
that "I am sure that the Church Act has had a beneficial
effect on the Priests; but their inveterate passion for
politics keeps them still in excitement • • • "

5
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The Fenians played a significant role in Gladstone's
timing on the Irish church question.

Until the Fenians

presented Gladstone with the spector of an Ireland riven
from England, he had been content to allow the issue to
proceed at a slow and steady pace.

Gladstone moved quickly

to redress Irish grievances once the Fenians, after the
incident at Manchester, had shown that they could generate
sympathy on the part of a large number of the Irish.

The

Fenians did more than convince Gladstone of the urgency of
disestablishment.

They convinced him that to delay any

further would seriously jeopardize the existence of the
union between the two nations.

F.

s.

L. Lyons caught the

essence of the significance of the Fenians to Irish history.
While Fenian violence turned many against the Irish,
• • • it could equally well prompt thoughtful men
to look beyond the violence to what had created the
violence and to wonder if the time had not come to
woo Ireland from the path of desperation by a
sustained attempt at constructive reform.
That one
of those who now began to think this way was
Gladstone was not the least, if perhaps the most
unexpected of the legacies left by the Fenians to
6
posterity.
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